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The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay
The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive
Pay
Brian R. Cheffins and Randall S. Thomas
In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are
characterized by a strong emphasis on pay-for-performance and by a highly
lucrative "upside." There is much discussion of the possibility that executive
pay practices will globalize in accordance with this pattern. This Article
assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur.
After surveying briefly the key components of managerial remuneration and
after examining the essential elements of the "U.S. pay paradigm," the Article
considers market-oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global
compensation imperative." These include wider dispersion of share ownership,
more cross-border hiring of executives, growing international merger and
acquisition activity, and expansion of business activity by multinational
enterprises. The Article will also take into account possible obstacles to the
Americanization of executive pay. These could arise from various legal sources
(such as corporate law, tax rules, and labor law) as well as "soft law" and
"culture." It must be recognized, however, that law could foster as well as
hinder a move toward U.S.-style remuneration. For instance, the introduction of
tougher disclosure rules seems particularly likely to have this effect.
This Article does not assess in detail whether the Americanization of
executive pay would be a "good thing." It makes a normative contribution,
however, by identifying obstacles policymakers should address if they want to
promote convergence. It also draws attention to strategies regulators might
adopt if they conclude that a move towards U.S.-style compensation
arrangements would be a mistake.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that executive pay "is the most intractable conundrum in
global corporate governance."1 To the extent that this is accurate, one factor has
served to complicate matters more than any other. This is the growing influence
of the "U.S. pay paradigm," characterized by highly "incentivized" and
lucrative compensation arrangements.2 Allegedly, a "global compensation
1. John Plender, An Assault on Boardroom Excess, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at 23.
2. Michael Cave, I'm Worth It, Baby, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 2, 2000, at 21. To most Europeans,
"compensation" means indemnities for injury or damages. They use the word "remuneration" when
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imperative" is at work3 that can be alternatively dubbed "the Americanization of
international pay practices." 4 "As markets become truly global, you'll see the
differences in compensation shrink," the managing director of one executive
search firm has predicted.5 Or, as a leading U.S. expert on managerial
remuneration has been quoted as saying, "the rest of the world is moving to our
,6pay model."
Not all agree that a "global shakeup in executive comp" 7 is taking place
along American lines. Various observers believe that the divergence between
the United States and other countries will persist and may even widen. 8 For
instance, the author of a well-known book on executive pay has suggested that
"[t]he notion of closing the gap is laughable.... When you're 200 laps behind
and driving a supercharged Audi, how do you catch up with an American car
with 5,000 horsepower?" 9
Despite the controversy over the potential globalization of executive pay,
the issue has attracted relatively little attention in legal circles.' 0 This Article
addresses the gap in the literature by examining the factors likely to affect
convergence on the managerial remuneration front. After surveying the essential
elements of managerial compensation in the United States and elsewhere, the
Article canvasses market-oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global
compensation imperative." Still, while market forces will undoubtedly influence
international trends in executive pay to some degree, it is difficult to predict
whether they will act as decisive agents of change. This is because, as the
Article discusses, legal regulation and business "culture" may hinder
referring toall the elements for rewarding work. See Gary Parker, Establishing Remuneration Practices
Across Culturally Diverse Environments, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS MGMT., Apr. 1, 2001, at 23,
available at 2001 WL 7675825. These terms will be used interchangeably here.
3. Matthew E. Davis, Fast Forward: The Global Compensation Imperative, ACA NEWS, May 2000,
at 22.
4. Tom Leander, The Global Shakeup in Executive Comp, 12 GLOBAL FIN. No. 8, 1, 1. See infra
notes 73 to 115 and related discussion for further background, as well as Francis Cairncross, The Best...
and the Rest (A Survey of Pay), ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 13-14. Equating globalization with
Americanization is, of course, not a practice restricted to executive pay. See, e.g., James Cox, US Success
Draws Envy, Protests, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2000, at B1.
5. Julia Flynn, Managing Change: Pay for UK. CEOs Trails US; Global Consolidation Could
Bring Change, WALL ST. J. (Europe), June 6, 2000, at 28.
6. David Cay Johnston, American-Style Pay Moves Abroad: Importance of Stock Options Expands
in a Global Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at CI (quoting Professor Kevin J. Murphy).
7. Leander, supra note 4.
8. Stephen Gates, Aligning Performance Measures and Incentives in European Companies, 9 ACA.
J. 3, 19 (2000), available at 2000 WL 15531300 (quoting a Scandinavian management consultant); Susan
J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More than Your Executive: Rationalizing Executive Pay in a Global
Economy, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 63, 80-86 (2001); Cf Cath Blackledge, Euroland Bonanza, EUROPEAN,
June 8, 1998, at 20 (quoting Professor Leo Murray, director of the Cranfield School of Management).
9. Adam Bryant, American Pay Rattles Foreign Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, § 4, at I
(quoting Graef Crystal, author of IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES (W.W. Norton, 1991)).
10. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of 'Germany Inc.': The Case of Executive Pay, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 497 (2001) [hereinafter Cheffms, Metamorphosis]; but see Stabile, supra note 8.
Vol. 1: No. 2, 2004
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convergence sufficiently to vindicate a claim made by two compensation
consultants in 1999: "Global Pay? Maybe Not Yet!""
The U.S. pay paradigm has sparked controversy at home. 12 Not surprisingly,
then, a potential shift towards U.S.-style compensation arrangements has proved
contentious in other jurisdictions.' 3 This Article does not assess in detail
whether convergence along American lines would be a "good thing." Instead, its
primary purpose is to identify and analyze the variables that will determine
whether such a shift is likely to take place. 14 This does not mean, however, that
the Article is purely descriptive. The authors recognize that lucrative U.S. pay
packages could either align the interests of shareholders and executives or
instead enable self-serving managerial "rent extraction."' 5 Also, the Article
makes a significant normative contribution by identifying obstacles regulators
ought to address if they are seeking either to promote or hinder a shift towards
the lucrative, incentive-based model of executive pay that prevails in the United
States.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II gives an overview of the "U.S.
pay paradigm," emphasizing the special position of American chief executives;
Part III discusses arrangements in other countries; Part IV offers an analysis of
market factors that might promote convergence of executive pay practices along
American lines; Parts V and VI consider the impact which legal regulation
might have on any sort of globalization trend; and Parts VII and VIII examine
the potential effects of "soft law" and "culture." A brief series of normative
observations forms the Article's conclusion.
II. THE U.S. PAY PARADIGM
When assessing the characteristics of executive pay in the United States, it is
important to recognize the distinctive position of American chief executives. On
the compensation front, American chief executive officers (CEOs) are "a breed
apart."' 6 This pivotal attribute of the U.S. pay paradigm manifests itself chiefly
11. Steven E Gross & Per L. Wingerup, Global Pay? Maybe Not Yet, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS
REV., July 1, 1999, at 25, 33-34, available at 1999 WL 12755622.
12 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds.,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2551-55 (Elsevier, 1999); CEO Pay: Is Greed Good?, Bus.
WK., Apr. 19, 1999, at 186.
13. See, e.g., Alan Mitchell, Grande Bouffe in the Executive Suite, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 15, 1999,
at 19; Damn Yankees, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 206; Johnston, supra note 6; Sean Silcoff, Corporate
Elite Takes Home a 43% Pay Rise, NAT'L POST, May 22, 2001, at C01, available at 2001 WL 20484352.
14. One of the authors has explicitly addressed the pros and cons of the U.S. executive pay model in
another paper: Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap. Board Capture or
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171 (2004).
15. See infra notes 122-139 and accompanying text. The "rent extraction" terminology is borrowed
from Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (2002).
16. Amanda Bennett, Managers' Incomes Aren't Worlds Apart, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1992, at B1.
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in three ways. First, American chief executives have highly "incentivized" pay
arrangements. Second, relative to rank-and-file workers, their remuneration is
very lucrative. Third, even compared to other senior managers within their own
companies, American CEOs are remarkably well paid. These aspects of U.S.
executive compensation will now be reviewed in turn.
A. Highly "Incentivized" Pay
For a rank-and-file American employee, pay is typically fixed at a
prescribed hourly, monthly, or annual level, irrespective of contingencies such
as firm performance. By contrast, the compensation packages of American chief
executives tend to have a substantial variable component, in that entitlement
depends on the satisfaction of prescribed conditions. 17 Admittedly, doubts exist
as to whether the targets set are sufficiently robust to ensure that CEOs will
suffer meaningful penalties when corporate performance is sub-optimal and
whether CEOs will be precluded from reaping a windfall simply because there
has been a general rise in stock prices.18 Nevertheless, data compiled by
economists Martin Conyon and Kevin Murphy for a study of executive
compensation in the United States and Britain reveal that "incentivized"
remuneration is clearly important for American CEOs.
Conyon and Murphy surveyed pay arrangements in over 1600 publicly
traded American corporations and found that, as of 1997, the typical U.S. CEO
received 29% of overall annual compensation in the form of base salary and
63% by way of variable remuneration. 19 Stock option grants, which give
managers the right to buy equity from their company at a prescribed "strike" or
"exercise" price, were by far the most important type of incentive pay (42% of
total compensation). 20 Next in line, at 17% of total compensation, was the
annual bonus, typically a cash payment awarded when a company has met
specified yearly targets based on criteria such as share price or accounting
earnings.21 Finally, Conyon and Murphy dealt with the long-term incentive plan
17. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 113 (Clarendon
Press, 1997); JOSEPH J. MARTOCCHIO, STRATEGIC COMPENSATION: A HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
APPROACH 5, 93 (Prentice Hall, 2004).
18. See, e.g., Bebchuk etal.,supra note 15, at 801-2,815-17.
19. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United
States and the United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. 640, 646-47 (2000).
20. Id. For more recent figures suggesting that stock options may be more important than Conyon
and Murphy's study indicates, see Michael Casey, Stock Options Didn't Work; What Will?, WALL ST. I.,
Aug. 26, 2002, at A2 (indicating that options constituted approximately 69% of the compensation of
CEOs in top U.S. companies).
21. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at 646. For an article discussing the nature of annual bonus
plans, see Peter Chingos, Annual Incentive Plans for Management, in Lance A. Berger & Dorothy R.
Berger eds., THE COMPENSATION HANDBOOK: A STATE-OF THE-ART GUIDE TO COMPENSATION
STRATEGY AND DESIGN, 349, 352-55 (McGraw-Hill, 2000) [hereinafter COMPENSATION HANDBOOK].
Vol. 1: No. 2, 2004
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(LTIP), a bonus scheme that operates over several years rather than annually.2
According to their data, LTIPs composed 4% of the compensation of a typical
CEO of a publicly traded company.
23
As data compiled by economists Brian Hall and Jeffery Liebman reveal, the
popularity of stock options as a form of CEO compensation is a relatively recent
24phenomenon. According to their figures, in 1980, the average value of an
American chief executive's salary and annual bonus was $655,000 in real 1994
dollars, and the average value of stock option grants was $155,000. As of 1994,
the salary and bonus had risen 97% to $1,293,000. In contrast, the average value
of stock option grants grew by 683%, to $1,213,000. Over the same period, the
fraction of CEOs receiving stock option awards increased from 30% to nearly
70%. Stock options continued to grow in importance throughout the remainder
of the 1990s.
25
The end of the bull market in 2000 and consequent demands for greater
managerial accountability resulting in enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
200226 led to speculation that U.S. corporations would cut back on the granting
27of stock options. Massive grants of stock options have indeed become less
28frequent over the past few years. Still, the vast majority of companies continue
to use this form of executive remuneration. 2 9 Moreover, the total value of long-
term incentive compensation awarded to top managers has remained largely
constant, as various companies have begun to substitute other forms of
performance-oriented remuneration for stock options. 30 For instance, restricted
stock, which cannot be sold until the recipient serves at the company for a
specified period of time, is emerging as one popular alternative.
31
22. Instead of cash, LTIPs often award executives with either "restricted stock" (equity that cannot
be sold for a specified number of years) or "units" under a performance scheme that allows them to
receive financial benefits akin to owning equity without actually giving them shares (e.g. "phantom
stock" or "stock appreciation rights"). See Jeffrey S. Hyman, Long-Term Incentives, in COMPENSATION
HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 357.
23. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at F646-48.
24. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON.
653, 661-63 (1998); see also Ernie Englander & Allen Kaufman, Executive Compensation, Political
Economy, and Managerial Control: The Transformation of Managerial Incentives and Ideology, 1950-
2000, 16-17, SMPP Working Paper 03-01, George Washington University School of Business (January
2003) (http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=408820).
25. Englander & Kaufman, supra note 24, at 17; Ruth Simon & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Options
Overdose, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2001, at CI.
26. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
27- Henry Morgenbesser et al-, Do Stock Options Have a Future in America?, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Sept. 2002, at 15; Nanette Bymes, Beyond Options, BUS. WK., July 28, 2003, at 34.
28. Patrick McGeehan, A Remix in the Grants of Options and Stock, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2003, § 3,
at 4.
29. id.
30. Gains in Executive Compensation Moderating, TOWERS PERRIN MONITOR, May 2003, available
at http://www-towers.com/towers/ (reporting on a survey of seventy-five major companies indicating that
long-term incentive pay for CEOs was $3,350,000 in 2002 proxy statements and $3,340,000 in 2003).
31. Joann S. Lublin, With Options Tainted, Companies Award Restricted Stock, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
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B. Lucrative Compensation
In addition to providing historical perspective on the use of stock options,
the Hall and Liebman data demonstrate that CEO pay in the United States is
highly lucrative. More recent figures from other sources drive home the same
point. For instance, according to a 2001 study of worldwide executive pay by
remuneration consultants Towers Perrin (which used as a benchmark an
industrial company with approximately $500 million in annual sales), total
annual remuneration for a U.S. chief executive averaged $1,933,000.32
Compensation levels are even higher at large companies. According to a survey
of 2002 data by Business Week, the median total compensation for the 365 most
highly paid chief executives in the United States was $3.7 million, and average
pay was $7.4 million.
33
A highly publicized by-product of the lucrative compensation packages
received by American chief executives is a dramatic disparity between their pay
and that of rank-and-file workers. 34 Figures compiled by Hall and Liebman
illustrate that the divergence became particularly pronounced during the 1980s
and 1990s. 35 In 1982, the direct compensation of the average CEO (salary and
bonus plus the value of stock option grants) was thirty times greater than the pay
of the typical employee. Between 1982 and 1994, the average CEO's direct
compensation increased 175%, or approximately 8.8% annually. During the
same time period, the typical employee's pay grew 7.2%, or 0.6% annually. As
a result, by 1996, CEO direct compensation was 210 times that received by an
average employee. 36 This disparity grew substantially through 2001, when
dramatic growth in executive pay shuddered to a halt.
3 7
C. CEOs are Paid More Than Other Senior Managers
Unlike the highly publicized comparisons between CEOs and rank-and-file
2003, at B 1; Howard Stock, CEO Bonuses Grow, Despite Mostly Disappointing Returns, INVESTOR REL.
Bus., June 9, 2003, available at 2003 WL 9295256; Paula Todd, Preparing for What's to Come in
Executive Compensation, TOWERS PERRIN MONrrOR, July 2003, available at
http://www.towersperrin.com.
32. TOWERS PERRIN, WORLDWIDE TOTAL REMUNERATION 20 (2001).
33. Louis Lavelle, Special Report: Executive Pay, Bus. WK, April 21, 2003, at 86 (discussing results
of Business Week's 53
rd 
Annual Pay Scoreboard).
34. See, e.g., Don Bauder, Skewed Distribution of Wealth Has Us on Perilous Path, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 22, 2001, at H2; James Flanigan, Wanted: Executives Worthy of Respect, L.A. TIMES,
May 4, 2003, at CI; Geneva Overhosler, More on the Inflated Pay of Business Titans, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 5, 1999, at 9.
35. Hall & Liebman, supra note 24, at 661-67. For figures confirming the same historical pattern,
see Richard Donkin, Leap in US CEO Pay, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at 36.
36. Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 440
(2003).
37. Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2002: CEO's Cook the Books, Skewer the Rest of Us
14-16 (2002), available at http://www.faireconomy.org/press/2002/EE2002.pdf.
Vol. 1: No. 2, 2004
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employees, relatively little has been said about the compensation disparity
between U.S. chief executives and other senior managers.38 Nevertheless, the
available evidence indicates that the divergence is significant. For instance,
according to the same Towers Perrin survey that pegged annual CEO pay at
$1,933,000, the total compensation of U.S. CEOs was 4.3 times greater than that
of human resources directors in equivalent companies. 39 Furthermore, a study
using 2000 data found that CEOs of large manufacturing companies earned
$1.82 in total compensation for every $1 earned by the second-highest paid
40
executive, and $3.44 for every $1 earned by the fifth-highest paid executive.
In addition to receiving substantially better pay than other top managers,
U.S. chief executives tend to have more "incentivized" pay arrangements.
According to 2001 data from Towers Perrin, the ratio of long-term incentives
(defined to encompass stock options, stock grants, and similar awards) to salary
was 1.61 to 1 for a typical American chief executive, but only .66 to 1 for a
typical human resource director.41 A study using 2000 data showed a similar
pattern, with CEOs in large American manufacturing firms receiving, on
average, stock option grants worth 636% of salary, while the equivalent figure
for the other top four executives was only 390%.42 A by-product of this pattern
is that, according to figures compiled in the mid-1990s, the average pay-
performance sensitivity for a chief executive of an American public company
was $41.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth and the
equivalent figure for executives with divisional responsibilities was only
$3.68. 43
III. EXECUTIVE PAY IN THE REST OF THE WORLD
American CEOs are not merely a "breed apart" within their own country.
Rather, their remuneration arrangements are also distinctive by international
standards. As this Part discusses, companies located outside of the United States
place less emphasis on performance-oriented pay and award less lucrative
managerial compensation packages than do their American counterparts. Still,
38. Harley E. Ryan & Roy A. Wiggins, Differences in the Compensation Structures of the CEO and
Other Senior Managers, 6 J. Bus. & ECON. STUD. 22, 22-23 (2000); Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A.
Samwick, Performance Incentives Within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility, 58 J. FIN.
1613, 1614, 1637-38 (2003). For a discussion as to why this might be the case, see PAUL MILGROM &
JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 427 (Prentice Hall, 1992).
39. TowERs PERRIN, supra note 32, at 20-21.
40. Derived from Englander & Kaufman, supra note 24, at 32 (setting out data initially compiled by
the Conference Board),
41. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 26-27. On the definition of long-term incentives for the
purposes of the Towers Perrin study, see id. at 3.
42. Englander & Kaufman, supra note 24, at 17, 31.
43. Aggarwal & Samwick, supra note 38, at 1636-38. Of the amounts in question, $40.26 could be
attributed to stock and options in the case of CEOs, and the equivalent figure for divisional executives
was $3.47.
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there is some evidence of a shift towards U.S. compensation patterns.
A. Less Emphasis on Performance-Oriented Pay than in the United States
In the United States, variable pay is a much more important component of
CEO remuneration than is the case elsewhere. The award of annual bonuses
contributes partially, though not crucially, to this divergence. For instance, the
Towers Perrin survey cited earlier indicates that in an American industrial
company with annual sales of $500 million, the CEO's annual bonus is likely to
be 56% of salary. 4 Comparatively speaking, this is a high figure, though not
outstandingly so. Indeed, in two jurisdictions (Australia and Venezuela), the
annual bonus to salary ratio was actually higher than this, and in many of the
other countries, the equivalent figure was at least half. 45 On the other hand,
American companies really stand out when it comes to long-term incentive
schemes. As of 2001, according to Towers Perrin, this form of compensation
constituted 161% of salary for a typical American chief executive.46 Only
Canada was close to this figure at 90%, and the top European country, Britain,
lagged far behind at 44%.
Regarding executives other than CEOs, incentive-oriented pay is again a key
cause of disparities between the United States and elsewhere. As is the case with
chief executives, arrangements designed to operate over the long haul are the
pivotal consideration. According to Towers Perrin figures from 2001, the annual
bonus to salary ratio of an average American human resource director in an
industrial company with annual sales of $500 million broadly corresponded to
the figures in other countries. 47 Matters were different, however, with respect to
variable pay geared to long-term incentives. According to the Towers Perrin
data, this type of compensation amounted to 66% of base salary for the average
American human resource director.4 In only two out of the twenty-five
jurisdictions surveyed (Malaysia and Singapore) was the long-term incentive to
base salary ratio even half of what it was in the United States. Thus, the bias in
favor of incentive-oriented pay which exists for CEOs of American companies
44. Id. at 26.
45. It should be bome in mind, however, that the Towers Perin data may conceal some important
cross-border differences concerning the use of annual bonuses. Conyon and Murphy's study of executive
compensation in the United States and Britain indicates this. Conyon and Murphy discovered that the
annual bonus constituted much the same percentage of total compensation in the two countries and that
the percentage of CEOs receiving bonuses was roughly the same in the two countries. Nevertheless, they
found that when bonuses were awarded, the payments in the United States were on average triple those
granted in Britain. See Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at nn.647-48.
46. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 26.
47. Id. at 27. The annual bonus of an American human resource director amounted to 29% of salary.
Annual bonuses were awarded to human resource directors in all of the twenty-five other jurisdictions
Towers Perrin surveyed, and in thirteen of these, the average annual bonus constituted 20% or more of
annual basic compensation.
48. Id. at 25.
Vol. 1 : No. 2, 2004
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is also present with other U.S. senior managers, albeit on a lesser scale.
B. Executive Pay is Lower Outside the United States
In addition to receiving remuneration packages with a stronger bias in favor
of variable compensation, U.S. CEOs are much better paid overall than their
counterparts in other countries. According to the Towers Perrin data cited
earlier, total annual pay for a typical U.S. chief executive was $1,933,000.
49
This amount was more than double the average for CEOs in all of the other
twenty-five countries surveyed, and was more than triple the average in all but
six (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China/Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, and the
United Kingdom).
With lower CEO compensation being the norm outside the United States,
foreign companies exhibit a less dramatic pay gulf between chief executives and
rank-and-file workers than their American counterparts. Admittedly, in some
comparatively poor countries such as Venezuela and Brazil,5'chief executive
compensation is a greater multiple of average employee pay than in the United
States. Still, in comparison with leading industrial nations, the United States
stands alone. According to data from 1999, while a U.S. CEO earned thirty-four
times the average factory wage, the comparable figure was twenty-four in
Britain, thirteen in Germany, and eleven in Japan. 5 2 Moreover, these numbers
may underestimate the disparity in the United States, as some data suggest that
the ratio is at least seventy-seven to one in larger companies.
53
What makes CEO pay in the United States so much higher than elsewhere?
Salary differentials play a role, but not a major one. The Towers Perrin survey
cited earlier pegged the annual salary of an average U.S. CEO at approximately
$540,000.14 While this was the highest figure among the twenty-six jurisdictions
covered, CEOs in Argentina and Mexico both received base pay that exceeded




50. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 20.
51. Tony Jackson, The Fat Cats Keep Getting Fatter, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998, at 9.
52. Robert Taylor, Facts to Confound the Gurus, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at 16; see also John M.
Abowd & David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering, 13 J. ECON.
PERSP. 145, 160-61 (1999); Donkin, supra note 35 (setting out statistics that reveal much the same
pattern).
53. See Hall & Liebman, supra note 24, at 661-67. The primary source of inconsistency is the
amount that CEOs earn in the United States. The figure cited in the Taylor study, supra note 52, was
$1,351,000, whereas in the Hall and Liebman study, supra note 24, mean CEO compensation was
$2,506,000 for 1994.
54. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 20, 24.
55. Id. The Towers Perrin figures for Argentina likely do not capture the full effect of downward
pressure on CEO salaries caused by a bitter recession in that country. For background, see Tony Smith,
Shrinking Salaries Hit Home in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, § 3, at 6.
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What about fringe benefits ("perks")? Do they contribute significantly to the
international gap in CEO pay? While the perks that larger American companies
make available to retiring CEOs have recently generated controversy,5 6 the
answer is no. According to Towers Perrin's 2001 survey on international
executive pay, fringe benefits are not exceptionally generous in the United
States.57 The Towers Perrin data indicate that benefits such as company
contributions to retirement and insurance plans and perquisites such as company
cars and club memberships constituted 11% of the total compensation of an
average U.S. CEO. The equivalent percentage was higher in twenty of the
twenty-six countries dealt with in the study.5 8
What, then, separates U.S. CEOs from their counterparts in other countries?
The answer is that long-term incentive schemes, such as stock option packages
and LTIPs, are primarily responsible for the disparities between the United
States and elsewhere. Annual bonuses for American CEOs are quite generous
by world standards, but not inordinately soi 9 On the other hand, the long-term
incentive remuneration to base salary ratio is considerably higher in the United
States than elsewhere. 60 Since the salaries of American CEOs are already the
highest in the world, the end result is that U.S. companies award total
compensation that well exceeds that granted in other countries. According to the
Towers Perrin survey on international executive pay, a typical U.S. chief
executive officer received approximately $870,000 annually in the form of long-
term incentive compensation. 6 1 In only two of the other twenty-five jurisdictions
studied did aggregate annual CEO compensation match this figure (Argentina at
$879,000 and Mexico at $867,000).62
It is helpful to put the raw data in context. The current pattern in CEO
remuneration worldwide is consistent with historical trends. Survey evidence
from the early 1960s onwards indicates that American chief executives have
consistently been paid more than their foreign counterparts. 63 As the 1990s
56. David Leonhardt and Geraldine Fabrikant, Many Chiefs are Retaining Extra Benefits in
Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at C1; Carol Hymowitz, Inactive Chiefs No Longer Need to be
Pampered, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at BI.
57. Moreover, amid accounting and fraud scandals, various large U.S. companies have begun to cut
back on the perks they do offer to top corporate officials. Lynnley Browning, The Perks Still Flow (But
With Less Fizz), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, § 3, at 6.
58. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 24. On how the terms were defined for the purposes of the
study, see id. at 3. See Shawn Tully, American Bosses are Overpaid.. or Their Counterparts in Europe
are Underpaid, FORTUNE, Nov. 7, 1988, at 121; Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 52, at 146, Table I
(according to 1996 data, out of twelve industrialized countries, the total value of fringe benefits offered
by U.S. corporations to CEOs only ranked fifth).
59. See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 20,24, 26.
62. Id. at 20.
63. Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 52, at 146, Table 1 (setting out data for 1984 and 1996); Arch
Paton, Executive Compensation Here and Abroad, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1962, at 144, 152 (citing
data from McKinsey & Co.); Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or
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began, there was some speculation that the gap between the United States and
elsewhere was closing.64 By the middle of the decade, however, any such
narrowing had stalled as dramatic increases in long-term incentive
compensation caused American executive pay to rise to unprecedented levels.
6 5
Also noteworthy is that U.S. CEOs do not seem to sacrifice job security for
higher pay. Though some have suggested that chief executives outside the
United States do not face the same external scrutiny as their American
counterparts, 66 the reality appears to be different. Data from the 1980s indicate
that CEOs in Japan and Germany were, if anything, more likely to be dismissed
than American chief executives when a company suffered a major share price
decline or a drop in earnings. 67 More recently, a 2000 study carried out by
management consultants Drake Beam Morin revealed that CEO turnover rates
are equally high world-wide. 68 Moreover, according to data from 2002, CEO
tenure was shorter in Europe than in North America, and the dismissal rate for
sub-standard performance was roughly equivalent.
69
A final point to keep in mind when thinking about the disparity between
CEO pay levels in the United States and elsewhere is that the situation is not
nearly as exceptional with lower-ranking executives. As mentioned, a notable, if
little remarked upon feature of the U.S. pay paradigm is that CEOs are much
better paid than other senior managers. 70 The discrepancy is not as substantial
elsewhere. Again, according to the 2001 Towers Perrin survey on international
managerial remuneration, the ratio of chief executive to human resource director
pay was 4.3 to 1 in the United States.7 This was considerably greater than the
equivalent figure in other major industrial economies, such as France (2.4 to 1),
Germany (2.0 to 1), Japan (2.4 to 1), and Britain (2.2 to 1).72
the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 252 (1983). An exception to the pattern is International Executive
Compensation, WHARTON MAG., Winter 1978, at 59, but this survey only dealt with base salaries.
64. See, e-g., John Burgess, Big Bucks for Executives Finds Some Favour Abroad, WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 1991, at HI; Joann S. Lublin, The Continental Divide: The Gap Between Executive Pay in the U.S.
and in Europe Is Narrowing, but It May Never Close, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1990, at R28.
65. Tara Parker-Pope, So FarAway, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R12.
66. Katherine Gay, Canadian Pay Hampers CEO Talent Hunt, FIN. POST, Apr. 22, 1995, at 57;
Richard Morais et al., The Global Boss' Pay: Where (and How) the Money Is, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at
90; Paul G. Wilhelm, Application of Distributive Justice Theory to the CEO Pay Problem:
Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 469, 474 (1993).
67. Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of
Germany, Japan and the US, 9(4) J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86, 88-89 (1997).
68. Sam Marshall, The Disposable CEO, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 14, 2000, at I (discussing CEO
turnover and job security as presented in a study by Drake Beam Morin, CEO Turnover and Job
Security: A Special Report (2000)) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
69. Chuck Lucier et al., Deliver or Depart, STRATEGY + BUS., Summer 2003, Special Report, at 1,
6, 12, available at http://www.strategy business.com/press/article/21261 ?pg=0.
70. See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32.
71. Id.
72. Derived from data set out in TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 20-21. The contemporary pattern
constitutes something of a reversal of historical trends. According to data from the early 1960s, the
divergence between CEO compensation and the compensation made available to other top executives
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C. Evidence of Convergence
Since performance-related remuneration (especially stock options and other
incentivized pay with a long-term orientation) serves to distinguish executive
pay in the United States from that in other countries, 73 an internationally
oriented shift towards performance-based compensation would constitute a
significant convergence trend. There is some evidence to suggest that such a
pattern is in fact developing. First of all, annual bonuses appear to be an
increasingly important element of overall compensation worldwide. The Towers
Perrin survey of worldwide executive remuneration for 2001 indicates that in
eighteen of the twenty-six jurisdictions covered, the annual bonus to salary ratio
was higher for CEOs than it was in 1996. 74 For human resource directors, the
outcome was similar in twenty-one countries.
75
The same pattern is evident with long-term incentive compensation.
According to the Towers Perrin data, in 1996 there were fourteen jurisdictions
where chief executives did not participate in a long-term incentive scheme and
twenty where the human resource director did not do so. By 2001, these figures
had dropped to four for both CEOs and human resource directors.76 Moreover,
in those countries where long-term incentive plans were in place in 1996 and
2001 for both CEOs and human resource directors, the long-term incentive
scheme to base salary ratio increased in every country but one (Switzerland).
77
Additional research from a Towers Perrin 2001 report on stock options
confirms that incentivized pay based on long-term targets is becoming
increasingly common outside the United States. According to the study, which
examined the practices of large, local companies headquartered in twenty-two
different countries, such compensation prevailed in only a handful of
jurisdictions in 1997.78 The study predicts, however, that soon it will be the
norm for executives to participate in long-term incentive schemes.7 9 Moreover,
consistent with the U.S. pattern, stock option plans are emerging as the most
popular type of performance-oriented compensation.80
Anecdotal evidence confirms the trends identified by the Towers Perrin
report. Traditionally, the American practice of granting stock options has not
been followed elsewhere. 81 In Britain, for instance, share option plans were
was greater outside the United States than it was in American firms. See Paton, supra note 63, at 152
(citing data from McKinsey & Co.).
73. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
74. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 26.
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id. at 26-27.
77. Id.
78- TOWERS PERRIN, STOCK OPTIONS AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2001).
79. Id.
80. Jd. at 5.
81. Shirliey Fung, How Should We Pay Them?, ACROSS THE BOARD, June 1999, at 36, 37-38; Luisa
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largely unknown until the mid-i 980s, when large numbers of companies began
to change their approach.82 Stock options began to gain ground in some other
European countries during this same period, 3 but they remained of negligible
importance in Germany and Italy.84 Likewise, long-term incentive compensation
of any sort was virtually unknown in countries such as Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Spain.
85
Matters have been changing in Europe during the past few years, however.
By the late 1990s, growing numbers of European executives were reportedly
receiving part of their pay in stock options or LTIPs.8 6 The trend towards
performance-oriented compensation attracted attention in the business press,
eliciting headlines such as "Euroland Bonanza"8 7 and "A Yawning Gap Begins
to Close." 88 Indeed, by 2001, most of Europe's large publicly traded companies
had adopted share option programs,
8 9
The experience has been similar in several countries in other regions. Until
recently, stock option plans were virtually unknown in Japan.90 Now, a growing
number of Japanese companies are creating such schemes for senior
employees. 91 Similarly, in Australia, stock option plans were not widely adopted
Kroll, Catching Up, FORBES, May 19, 1997, at 162. C.W. Smith & R.L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects
of Executive Compensation Plans, in R. Ball & C.W. Smith eds,, THE ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTING
POLICY CHOICE 347, 359 (McGraw-Hill, 1992) (originally published in 7 AuSTL. J. MGMT. 139 (1982))
(discussing the popularity of stock options in the United States since the 1950s).
82. Helen Kay, Have We Killed the Share Option?, DIRECTOR, Oct. 1995, at 64, 66; Laura Mazur,
Europay, ACROSS THE BOARD, Jan. 1995, at 40; Executive Pay; Perky, ECONOMIST (UK ed.), Oct. 8,
1988, at 48 (referring to share options as "the newest executive game").
83. Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Control and Executive Compensation in Large French
Companies, 24 J.L. & SOC'Y 85, 96 (1997); Lublin, supra note 64 (mentioning Austria, Denmark and
Norway). The evidence concerning France is, however, conflicting. See, e.g., Charles Peck et. al., Top
Executive Compensation: Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in THE
CONFERENCE BOARD, RESEARCH REPORT 1250-99-RR, 1999, at 19-21; Mazur, supra note 82.
84. Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds.,
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 943, 967
(Clarendon Press, 1998); Mazur, supra note 82; Andrea Melis, Corporate Governance in Italy, 8 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: IN'L REV. 347, 353 (2000).
85. Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 52, at 146. For more detail on Spain see Charlotte Villiers et al.,
Controlling Directors' Pay in English Law and Spanish Law, 2 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 377,
391-92 (1995).
86. Damn Yankees, supra note 13; Johnston, supra note 6.
87. Blackledge, supra note 8.
88. Tony Barber, FTDirector Survey, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2000, at 5.
89- Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in the EU: Comparative Law and Practice, in
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No. 09/2003, at 46-64 (offering data on adoption of share option
programs by FTSE Eurotop 300 companies), available at http://www.ecgi.org/wp/index.php (last visited
Dec. 8, 2004).
90. W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
(Harvard Business School Press, 1991); Steven Brull, Sony Links Executive Pay to Stocks, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1995, at 11; Michael Berger, A Look at Salaries in Japan, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1988, at
B8.
91. Nicholas Benes, Japan's Coming Shareholder Revolution, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2001, at
6; Yasmin Ghahremani, In the Company of Millionaires, ASIA WK., Mar. 17, 2000, available at 2000
WL 8936312. For further background, see Paul Abrahams, Japan's Ray of Hope, FIN. TIMES, May 6,
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prior to 1990,92 but have since become popular.9 3 Canada has experienced the
same trend, though most larger public companies did grant some stock options
prior to the 1990s.
94
While long-term incentive compensation is becoming more common as a
form of executive pay, it should not be assumed that American-style
compensation is now the international norm. It must be remembered that stock
options and similar incentive schemes remain much more lucrative in the United
States than elsewhere, particularly for CEOs. The Towers Perrin survey cited
earlier draws attention to this divergence by indicating that the ratio of long-
term incentive compensation to salary remains considerably higher in the United
States than in other countries. 95 This study, however, might not do full justice to
the disparity. While stock option grants did become firmly established in Britain
in the 1980s, 96 as of 1997, among CEOs receiving such compensation, the
median option grant in the United States was nearly twenty times that of
Britain.97
Also significant is that stock options made available to executives in other
countries often differ in type and form than those granted domestically. In the
United States, most companies award "plain vanilla" share options to
executives, meaning that options can be exercised without regard for
performance conditions.9" Therefore, management can be rewarded for any rise
in their company's share price, even if the increase was well below that realized
by competitors or by the market as a whole.99 On the other hand, in countries
such as Australia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Britain, it
is the norm for stock options to be awarded subject to performance
conditions. 100 With this sort of arrangement, executives are only able to exercise
1998, at 19; Restoration in Progress: A Survey of Business in Japan, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 8-9;
Lisa Shuchman, New Tool in Tokyo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R9.
92. Jane Hutchinson, Turning the Spotlight on the Boss's Pay, AGE, Apr. 8, 1992, at 19.
93. Jennifer Hill, Regulatory Rooms in Australian Corporate Law, 25 BROOK. J. OF INT'L L. 555,
601 (1999); Emily Cart, Up! Up! Up! CEO Salaries are on the Rise, AuSTL. FIN. REv., Oct. 3, 1998, at
28; Margot Saville, Up, Up and...Execs Double Pay in 5 Years, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 16,
2000, at 29; S. Karene Witcher, Salaries Surge as Concerns Seek Offshore Talent, Specifically in
America, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at 6.
94. CEO Compensation is Not Soaring, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 26, 1999, at A10; Sean Sileoff,
Corporate Elite Takes Home a 43% Pay Rise, NAT'L POST, May 22, 2001, at Cl; Philip Mathias, Just
How Fat are These Cats?, FIN. POST, Nov. 4, 1995, at 10; Eric Reguly, Pay-Performance Link Stretches
Thin, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 4, 1999, at B2. On the situation at the beginning of the 1990s, see Bruce
Cohen, Pay: What Top Executives Can Expect, FIN. POST, July 8, 1991, at 17.
95. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
97. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at F648.
98. Bebehuk et al., supra note 15, at 801-2; Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link
Executive Pay with Performance, HARV. BUS. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 91, 92-93.
99. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 796-97; Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 52, at 162; Rappaport,
supra note 98, at 93.
100. TOwERS PERRIN, supra note 78, at 7.
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options if the company has met specified "benchmarks" such as exceeding a
designated earnings per share target.
With respect to possible convergence on the executive pay front, increased
use of performance-related pay implies a shift towards potentially more
generous managerial compensation. Why is this the case? The key point to keep
in mind is that, for good reason, executives will have reservations about having
their pay tied directly to shareholder return.' 10 For instance, on diversification
grounds, they will dislike having their remuneration linked to the performance
of a company in which they have already tied up substantial human capital.
10 2
Also, since an individual company's stock price often fluctuates markedly, they
will fear significant swings in income. Moreover, they will worry about having
their remuneration tied to share prices since factors unrelated to the skill and
effort of a company's top people can influence its market standing.
0 3
Despite these various difficulties, companies seeking to recruit and retain
good people do have an ability to link managerial remuneration more closely
with shareholder return if that is a key priority. The strategy to adopt is
straightforward: offer a highly lucrative "upside." If the potential rewards are
large enough, a talented executive will accept the risks of linking remuneration
to shareholder return. 10 4 The upshot is that if foreign companies move towards
the U.S. pay paradigm by using more performance-related compensation, there
will be pressure to shift towards the sort of lucrative pay that serves to make
America's CEOs a "breed apart."
The analysis of executive pay convergence offered thus far has focused on
other countries moving towards the U.S. model, but a different convergence
scenario also merits consideration. Conceivably, recent economic conditions
might temper America's exceptional managerial compensation arrangements
and bring matters more in line with other nations. Indeed, declining stock
market prices and corporate scandals have undercut faith in "superstar" CEOs,
individuals who had formerly been lauded for their significant roles in realizing
the American economic expansion of the 1990s. 10 5 A predicted consequence of
this shift in attitude is the reining in of executive pay. 106 Indeed, one U.S.
101. Cheffins, supra note 17, at 686.
102. John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, FED. REv. BANK
N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv., Apr. 2003, at 27, 36-37 (saying that an executive will discount the value of a
grant of stock options because of poor diversification).
103. In companies with concentrated share ownership, there are additional reasons why managers
will not value highly compensation that is linked to share price performance. See infra notes 117 to 143
and accompanying text.
104. Cheffins, supra note 17, at 686-87.
105. Andrew Hill, The Business Mighty are Now Fallen, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 4, 2002, at 13;
Alan Eisner, The Era of CEO as Superhero Ends Amid Corporate Scandals, GLOBE & MAIL, July 10,
2002, at Cl; David Olive, How Celebrity CEOs Failed to Deliver, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 24, 2002, at
AO1.
106- Robert J. Samuelson, CEO Welfare, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at A23.
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compensation advisor proclaimed "the end of a golden era."'
0 7
It is possible that certain interrelated factors could operate simultaneously to
downgrade performance-oriented executive pay and to cut remuneration levels
for U.S. CEOs. The high-powered incentive plans that delivered spectacular
rewards when times were good may yield few benefits for executives when
companies are suffering from faltering shareholder retums.108 Investors
disillusioned by mediocre stock prices and corporate scandals may try to exert
pressure on companies to curb perceived management excesses. 10 9 Top
executives seeking to boost corporate morale and secure public relations
benefits might "share the pain" with employees and shareholders by voluntarily
surrendering pay to which they might otherwise be entitled."1 ) Finally, "star"
managers, nervous that a prolonged economic slump will make it difficult to
cash in on incentive-oriented compensation, might begin to use their negotiating
leverage to secure deals in which variable pay is featured less prominently."
1 I
Indeed, some evidence indicates that the configuration of executive pay in
the United States is being overhauled. According to a Business Week survey,
though the average total compensation of America's 365 most highly paid
executives was $7.4 million in 2002, this represented a 33% decline from 2001,
and the second year in a row in which there had been a decline.1 12 Still, it is
important to keep matters in perspective: the 2001-2002 drop in average CEO
compensation recorded by Business Week occurred not on account of wholesale
rearrangement of compensation schemes, but rather because massive payments
at the very top of the scale largely disappeared. Correspondingly, while average
pay for the 365 CEOs decreased by one third between 2001 and 2002, median
pay actually increased by 5.9%. "'
Other surveys of executive remuneration carried out by the business press
confirm that, while some downward revisions are occurring, these do not
"threaten the underlying nature of the CEO entitlement system." 114 Hence,
despite current economic conditions, the dismantling of the American model of
107. Joann S. Lublin, Under the Radar, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002, at B7.
108. Joarm S. Lublin, Hedging Their Bets, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2001, at RI; Janet McFarland, J.,
CEO Pay Fails to Mimic Profits, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 23, 2002, at B1.
109. Aaron Lucchetti, A Mutual Fund Giant is Stalking Excessive Pay, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002,
at C1; Caroline Daniel and Andrew Hill, Demands from Shareholders for Greater Transparency and
Accountability Over the Rewards Enjoyed by Corporate Leaders are Ringing Out at Annual Meetings
Across the US, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 15.
110. Lavelle, supra note 33 (discussing the CEO of Agilent Technologies Inc.); Brenda L. Moore,
No, Thanks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2001, at R4.
111. Lublin, supra note 108; Under Water, EcONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001, at 91; Is That Enough?,
ECONOMIST, May 3, 2003, at 72.
112. Lavelle, supra note 33.
113. Id.; see also Jerry Useem, Have They No Shame?, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 2003, at 56.
114. Samuelson, supra note 106; on the surveys in question, see also Useem, supra note 113; Joann
S. Lublin, Why the Get-Rich-Quick Days may be Over, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2003, at R1; Patrick
McGeehan, Again, Money Follows the Pinstripes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, sec. 3, at 1.
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executive pay does not appear to be happening. 1 5 It follows that, to the extent
that global convergence is imminent, it remains more likely that corporations in
other countries will move towards the American approach rather than the
reverse.
IV. MARKET-ORIENTED DRIVERS OF EXECUTIVE PAY
The foregoing discussion illustrates that companies outside the United States
pay their executives (and particularly their CEOs) in a manner that is
considerably different from their American counterparts. At the same time,
though, the disparity may be diminishing as companies around the world shift,
in varying degrees, towards the U.S. pay model.11 6 What might be providing the
impetus for this convergence trend? Market forces of various types are
potentially playing a role. This Part of the Article identifies examples and
concludes with some observations on how influential these market dynamics are
likely to be in the future.
A. Evolving Share Ownership Patterns
Share ownership in large U.S. business enterprises is typically widely
dispersed. Such diffusion results from the fact that most big companies are
publicly traded, and only in a minority of these does a single investor own a
substantial block of shares. 1 7 Britain's corporate economy is configured in a
similar fashion. 18 In other major industrial countries, however, concentrated
share ownership is the norm. In these jurisdictions, many large companies do
not trade on the stock market, and those which do frequently have a dominant
shareholder.119 Anecdotal evidence suggests that throughout continental Europe
and East Asia, the internationalization of both product and financial markets is
beginning to destabilize traditional ownership structures and cause some form of
convergence in the Anglo-American direction. 120 Tangible manifestations of
this trend include a significant increase in the number of publicly traded
115. Lublin, supra note 107; Wallowing in Wages, ECONOMIST (U.K. ed.), Apr. 6, 2002, at 65;
David Leonhardt, Did Pay Incentives Cut Both Ways?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, sec- 3, at 1; Joann S.
Lublin, Executive Pay Keeps Rising, Despite Outcry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at BI.
116. On this possibility, see supra notes 86 to 97 and accompanying text; See also Englander &
Kaufman, supra note 24, at 5, 7; Brett Clegg, Drawing Lines on Bonuses and Options, AUSTL. FIN. REv.,
Nov. 1, 1999, at 28; Fung, supra note 81, at 39-40; Ira T. Kay & Steven E. Rushbrook, The US Executive
Pay Model: Smart Business or Senseless Greed?, WORLDATWORK J., Jan. 2001, at 8.
117. John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law:
Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1699, 1703-04 (2002).
118. id. at 1703-04, 1750-54.
119. Id. at 1704.
120. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEo. L.J.
439, 449-52 (2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by
Widely Held Public Companies, 23 OxFORD. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter Cheffins,
Bedrock].
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companies and growth in the aggregate market capitalization of national stock
markets.' 21 If the momentum in favor of dispersed share ownership proves to be
robust, the reconfiguration could act as a catalyst for the Americanization of
executive pay.
To understand why a shift in ownership patterns potentially matters, it is
necessary to consider why managerial remuneration arrangements tend to vary
in accordance with a company's ownership structure. Take incentivized
compensation, for instance. In a publicly traded corporation with highly
dispersed share ownership, a managerial "agency cost" problem may exist that
can be addressed at least partially by establishing a strong correlation between
executive pay and corporate performance.' 22 By contrast, in a firm where
control is highly consolidated, the "core" shareholder(s) should have both the
means and motivation to discipline disloyal or ineffective managers.23
Monitoring, then, can at least partially displace the need for performance-related
compensation. 24 At the same time, a dominant investor fearing dilution of
control will be averse to share-based incentive schemes whereby managers who
hit performance targets could be transformed into major shareholders. 
125
Concentrated share ownership is also relevant to the use of incentivized
compensation because executives of companies lacking a dispersed investor
pattern will have legitimate grounds for being skeptical of rewards based on
share price performance. For any business that is not publicly traded, share
valuation will be difficult since the stock market will not be functioning as an
ongoing barometer of firm value.1 26 Even with companies listed on the stock
market, those with concentrated ownership structures will typically have a small
"free float," which means that share prices could be strongly influenced by
121. John C. Coffee Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 16-17 (2001); Christoph van der Elst, The Equity
Markets, Ownership Structures and Control: Towards an International Harmonization?, in Klaus J. Hopt
& Eddy Wymeersch, eds., CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 3, 7-14 (Oxford University Press,
2003).
122. Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a Greater Say Over
Executive Pay?: Learning From the US Experience, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 286, 308, 312 (2001).
123. Brian R. Cheffins, Minority Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 21 COMPANY LAW. 41
(2000).
124. Todd T. Milbourn, Comment on Colin Mayer's Financial Systems and Corporate Governance,
154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 170, 174 (1998); Giorgio Brunello et al., Executive
Compensation and Firm Performance in Italy, 19 INT'L J. INDUST. ORG. 133, 140 (2001); Yun W. Park
et al., Controlling Shareholder and Executive Incentive Structure: Canadian Evidence, 17 CAN- J.
ADMIN. Sci. 245, 246 (2000); Ergun Dogan, Board Remuneration, Company Performance, and
Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Publicly Listed Malaysian Companies, 19 ASEAN ECON.
BULL. 319, 320 (2002).
Similar logic could be applied to lower ranking executives in a company with dispersed share ownership
if the chief executive is capable of engaging in careful monitoring and is financially motivated to follow
up. See Ryan & Wiggins, supra note 38, at 24-25.
125. Thomas Bates et al., Promotion Incentives and Executive Compensation in Family Firms 17
(2000) (unpublished working paper, on file with the author), Thomas, supra note 14, at 124.
126. Thomas, supra note 14, at 120.
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"noise" unrelated to prospective future earnings. Under such circumstances,
price fluctuations may not reflect in any meaningful way the quality of
managerial performance. 1
27
There is a body of empirical evidence which confirms that the adoption of
highly incentivized executive pay arrangements occurs less readily in
companies with a major blockholder. 128 Admittedly, there are some conflicting
data. 129 Still, if countries in which concentrated ownership is the norm for large
business enterprises are in fact shifting towards a more dispersed pattern, a
consequence may be greater momentum in favor of performance-oriented
managerial compensation.
The potential reconfiguration of share ownership, in addition to influencing
the use of incentive-based executive remuneration, might also affect aggregate
pay. On this count, work done by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David
Walker is instructive. 30 They argue that the setting of executive pay in the
typical American widely-held company is biased in favor of management, in
large part because board committees delegated the task of determining
compensation are often more beholden to management than to shareholders.
Correspondingly, top executives have considerable scope to extract "rent" in the
form of remuneration in excess of the level that would be optimal for
shareholders.
1 3'
Arguably, where core shareholders dominate, "rent extraction" is less likely
to occur via managerial compensation.' 32 Take the example of a company that
has a concentrated ownership structure in which the CEO is not part of the
dominant faction. Those with a controlling interest should be motivated to
prevent excessive compensation because any "unspent" money reverts to the
127. Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 52, at 155-57; Melis, supra note 84, at 353; Mazur, supra note
82; Parker-Pope, supra note 65. For illustrations of the point, see Maurizio Dallocchio, Why Do Italian
Stocks Read Like Opinion Polls?, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 11, 2001, at 7; Throw Out the Rule-Book,
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001, at 112.
128. Brunello et al., supra note 124, at 141, 155; Park et al., supra note 124, at 251-52; Paul
Durman, How Different Factors Affect the Level of Pay at the Top, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at 8
(discussing a report by SCA Consulting); Yur M. Park et al., Executive Pay Practices of Firms with
Dominant Shareholder CEOs: Self-Dealing or Efficient Contracting, 15 (2002) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://business.fullerton.edu/finance/yunpark/files/papers/DSCEO.doc) (last visited Dec. 3,
2004) (finding that executive pay is less stock-based when a CEO is a dominant shareholder than it is
when a company lacks a blockholder).
129. Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog, Managerial Remuneration: The Indirect Pay-for-
Performance Relation, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 317, 331-32 (2001); James J. Cordeiro & Rajarm Veliyath,
Beyond Pay for Performance: A Panel Study of the Determinants of CEO Compensation, 21 AM. Bus.
REv. 56, 59 (2003).
130. Bebehuk et al-, supra note 15. For additional explanations why concentrated share ownership
might be associated with lower levels of executive pay, see Bates et al., supra note 103, at 5-6, 10
(finding, however, that the situation would be different with executives below the CEO level); Corderio
& Veliyath, supra note 129.
131. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 754, 784-86.
132. Id. at 843-45; Ferrarini et al., supra note 89, at 11.
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shareholders, including those who qualify as "core" investors. 
133
Scrupulous blockholder monitoring of managerial remuneration is much less
likely to occur if the chief executive of a company with a concentrated
ownership structure is a member of the controlling group or family.
Nonetheless, even in such a situation, rent extraction via executive
compensation is likely to be muted. To the extent that the dominant faction in a
company attempts to exploit the private benefits of control, they will probably
take advantage of more clandestine and efficient methods such as diverting
promising business opportunities and arranging "sweetheart" deals with related
corporations. 34 Certainly, the available empirical evidence suggests that CEOs
who are also dominant shareholders are not "overpaid" as compared with other
chief executives.
135
The foregoing suggests that, to the extent that corporate ownership becomes
more dispersed in countries where blockholding currently prevails, there likely
will be a rise in executive pay levels as well as a shift towards U.S.-style
performance-oriented compensation. The attitudes of those likely to buy equity
as part of a shift towards increasingly diffuse share ownership would probably
reinforce this trend. One hallmark of the alleged transition away from traditional
blockholder arrangements is growing foreign portfolio investment by financial
intermediaries based in the United States and Britain (pension funds and mutual
funds, for example). 136 If companies from continental Europe, Asia, and Latin
America want to raise funds on international capital markets, they will be
obliged to respond to the preferences of these institutional investors.
1 37
American and British shareholders have generally sought to promote incentive-
oriented managerial remuneration and have been prepared to accept lucrative
133. Bebchuk el al., supra note 15, at 844; Corderio & Veliyath, supra note 129; Dogan, supra note
124, at 340; Kannan Ramaswamy et al., A Study of the Determinants of CEO Compensation in India, 40
MGMT. INT'L REV. 167, 172 (2000). For an example of this process in action, see S. Karene Witcher,
Executive Pay Growth in Asia is Stalling, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 2, 1998, at 6.
134. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 844-45. For more benign explanations regarding why CEO
pay will not be excessive in this instance, see Derek Matthews, Fat is a Relative Issue, MGMT. TODAY,
June 1996, at 50; Ramaswamy et al., supra note 133, at 182-83; Bates et al., supra note 125, at 5.
135. Park et al., Executive Pay, supra note 128, at 13-14; Ramaswamy et al., supra note 133, at 171,
182-83; Clifford G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
ECON. POL. REV., Apr. 2003, at 51, 56-57.
136. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. MeCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 213, 234
(1999); Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 153, 167 (2000); Robert Graham, A Punctured Reputation, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at 24;
Lean, Mean & European: Survey of European Business, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, at 9.
137. Sara Calian, On the Buy Side: Investor-Friendly Firms Sought, WALL ST. J. EuR., June 26,
2001, at 11; The End of Tycoons, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, at 93; Thomas Kamm, Europe's Move into
the Free Market Spurs a Massive Corporate Workout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1999, at Al; The Pull of the
Markets, LATIN FIN., Mar. 1, 2001, at 14; see also Patrick J. Lyons, A Global Vote for US Style of
Openness, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, § 3, at 4 (finding that the priorities of German and Japanese
institutional investors were similar to those of their Anglo-American counterparts).
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compensation for managerial "high-flyers.' 38 Correspondingly, growing
Anglo-American cross-border portfolio investment might serve to provide a
congenial environment for lucrative performance-based managerial
remuneration in countries where share ownership has traditionally been highly
concentrated. 139
While a shift towards dispersed ownership could imply the spread of an
increasingly American approach to executive pay, some cautionary notes are in
order. Although a growing number of companies outside the United States and
Britain are becoming versed in the Anglo-American way of doing business,
doubts still exist about whether any shift in attitude is more than superficial. 4 °
Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that the preferences which U.S. and U.K.
investors have concerning executive pay arrangements will have more than a
marginal influence for the foreseeable future.
Evidence from continental Europe also suggests that an immediate and
radical shift towards substantial ownership dispersion may in fact not be
imminent. For instance, while statistical evidence does establish clearly that it is
becoming more common for European companies to go public, 141 the general
trend among these newly-listed companies is to retain a concentrated ownership
structure. 142 Assuming this practice persists, controlling shareholders
presumably will continue to predominate even if the current trend toward
increased stock market participation remains on track. 143 This could have
significant implications for executive pay because the enduring influence of
138. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 122, at 308, 311-12; see also INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE NETWORK, Best Practices for Executive and Director Remuneration (2003), available at
http://www.icgn.org/documents/RemunerationBulletPts.pdf (outlining the best practice recommendations
of an organization of investors representing more than $10 trillion in assets). U.K. investors, however, are
more sceptical of lavish executive pay arrangements than their American counterparts. See Patience
Wheatcrofl, GSK and the Seeds of Change, TIMES (London), May 21, 2003, at 27; Michael Skapinker,
After Gamier: Why Executive Rewards in the US and the UK are Unlikely to Converge, FIN. TIMES
(U.K. ed.), May, 21, 2003, at 21; Sylvia Pfeifer, Bitter Pill for Glaxo, SUNDAY Bus. (London), May 25,
2003, at 9.
139. France's Boardroom Revolution, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at A20; Gates, supra note 8;
Leander, supra note 4, at 13; David Woodruff, Europe, A Latecomer, Embraces Options, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2001, at A18.
140. The Chaebol Spurn Change, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2000, at 83; Craig Karmin, Corporate
Governance Issues Hamper Emerging Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at C1; Peter Martin, Anglo-
Saxon Angst, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, § FT Money, at 18; Phillip Webster, Italy's Grand Families Back
in the Frame, SUN. BUS., Aug. 5, 2001, at 14.
141. Supra note 121 and related discussion.
142. MARC GOERGEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF
GERMAN AND UK INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 51-56, 78-83 (Edward Elgar, 1998) (discussing initial
public offerings in Britain and Germany); Wayne H. Mikkelson, Ownership and Operating Performance
ofCompanies that Go Public, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 281, 286-89 (1997) (discussing the United States); Marco
Pagano, Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 56-60 (1998) (discussing
public offerings in Italy); Martin Holm~n & Peter Hogfeldt, A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public
Offerings (2000) (unpublished working paper, on file with authors) (discussing initial public offerings in
Sweden).
143. Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going From London to Milan via
Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 36 (1999).
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blockholders will serve to diminish the likelihood of convergence towards the
U.S. executive pay model.
B. Cross-Border Hiring
While it cannot be taken for granted that share ownership patterns will soon
evolve along Anglo-American lines, there are other economic dynamics that
might nevertheless foster a partial executive pay transition. One is the growing
internationalization of the labor market for executives. It has been said that
"[t]he dawn of the millennium is ushering in a true global marketplace for
CEOs, with a record number of foreign CEOs running major companies in the
United States, Britain, and several other countries around the world."' 44 If this
prognosis is correct, increased cross-border hiring of top management might
promote the Americanization of executive pay.
There are various ways in which the growth of the nascent market for global
executive talent could prompt a shift to American-style managerial
compensation. One dynamic which could be relevant is that companies based
outside the United States will fear losing top people. In a global marketplace for
executive talent, gifted managers might be tempted to migrate to America to
take up generous remuneration packages stateside. Market forces will in turn
pressure foreign firms to restructure managerial compensation so as to conform
more closely to typical arrangements in the United States. 1
45
Increased cross-border hiring of Americans for top posts outside the United
States also might help to foster a reconfiguration of executive pay. A foreign
company may look stateside to recruit senior managers in order to take
advantage of the United States' comparatively deep executive talent pool.
146
Also, a company may want to signal that maximizing shareholder value is a
high priority by hiring a CEO from the country that embraces this notion most
firmly.147 Those aspiring to a top managerial position in the United States are
unlikely to leave the country unless a prospective foreign employer offers a
compensation package comparable to those which American companies
provide.' 48 Thus, large-scale recruitment of American executives by non-U.S.
144. Denis B.K. Lyons & Stuart Spencer, International CEOs on the Rise, CHIEF ExEc., Feb. 2000,
51,51.
145. See, e.g., Tully, supra note 58; Martin Dickson, Package Envy: Or the Curse of Keeping Up
with the Yanks, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2001, at 13; Dan Bilefsky, Mad About Money, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
2003, at R3; see also Gates, supra note 8 (discussing a survey of large European companies indicating
that 78% of total responses cited attracting and retaining executives as among the forces driving change
in European executive compensation).
146. Luiza Chwialkowska, How to Land an American Boss, NAT'L POST, Sept. 6, 1999, at A3; John
Plender, Cult of the US Manager, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at 19.
147. See Plender, supra note 146.
148. Delroy Alexander, Over-Hyped, Overpaid and Over Here, INVESTORS C-IRON., Nov. 24, 1995,
at 20; Chwialkowska, supra note 146; Matthews, supra note 134.
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companies could trigger global changes in approaches to executive pay.
149
While in theory the emergence of a global market for executive talent may
foster convergence in managerial compensation, how important are the relevant
dynamics likely to be in practice? According to some evidence, quite a bit. On
the "demand side" of the labor market, growing competition for managerial
talent apparently is forcing more companies to recruit internationally.'
50
Moreover, many large corporations seeking leaders capable of operating
effectively in a global marketplace are increasingly willing to select the best
managerial talent irrespective of country of origin.' 51 Turning to the "supply"
side of the equation, there are growing numbers of "true global nomads" who
speak English fluently, have honed their business skills in countries outside their
own, and are perfectly content to move to further their careers. 152 This
international cadre of executives offers companies a wide choice of potential
recruits.
Still, it cannot be taken for granted that internationalization of the
managerial labor market will be a robust cause of convergence in executive
pay. 53 First of all, foreign firms are unlikely to recruit an American to serve as
CEO unless he or she speaks the native tongue fluently. Even where language is
not a barrier, however, the recruitment of a U.S. chief executive may still tend to
be an exceptional event. 154 To illustrate, in Canada, many firms shy away from
hiring American CEOs because the large compensation package required to
recruit the new person will be too costly and may well create discord among
modestly paid incumbent executives.' 55 Even in Britain, the most popular
destination for Americans taking up a CEO post,' 56 hiring directly from the
United States is still considered risky.157 British companies in search of a "U.S.
149. Parker-Pope, supra note 65; Alexander, supra note 148; Tony Boyd, World Class, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Nov. 8, 2002, at 34; John Kipphoff& Tony Tassell, UK Pays a Big Price to Keep Up With the US,
FIN. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at 19; Cf Cave, supra note 2 (arguing that the effect of recruiting a U.S. CEO
will be transitory unless the company has to go back to the international marketplace to find a
replacement).
150. Gross & Wingerup, supra note 11, at 26.
151. Lyons & Spencer, supra note 144, at 52.
152. Davis, supra note 3, at 22; Lyons & Spencer, supra note 144, at 51; Stephen Overell, Changing
the Rules of Musical Chairs, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), Aug. 30, 2002, at 7.
153. Paul Lee, Not Badly Paid But Paid Badly, 10 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 69, 70-71
(2002); ICGN SUB-COMMITTEE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION, Executive Remuneration - The Caucus
Race (A Report to the International Corporate Governance Network), 19 (2002), available at
http:l/www.icgn.org/documents/remunerationreport-pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
154. On potential bias against foreign executives see, for example, Jo Johnson, A Gift for Much
More than Cosmetic Change, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2001, at 15; Joann S_ Lublin, American Advantage: It
Often Doesn't Pay to Work for a Foreign Company's US Unit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1991, at R4; Nancy
Dunne, Plugging Into European Jobs No Easy Task, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), Aug. 22, 2003, at 18.
155. Chwialkowska, supra note 146; Gay, supra note 66.
156. Lyons & Spencer, supra note 144, at 52; see also Keep on Purring, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1999,
at 25 (finding that fourteen of the thirty-one best-paid executives in Britain were from the United States).
157. Plender, supra note 146 (noting that it is more conventional to hire Americans who have risen
through the ranks).
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superman" typically do so in order to address pre-existing credibility problems
and deflect pressure from impatient investors.'
58
Likewise, it cannot be taken for granted that American companies will hire
foreign-born managers on a wide scale. 159 Tough immigration regulations
constitute a potential deterrent. 160 Also, evidence from Britain and Canada
suggests that the number of top executives actually in a position to move
remains quite small. In both countries, the argument that senior management
might depart to the United States has been invoked to defend significant
increases in executive pay. 161 Nevertheless, in Britain, skeptics say that no more
than a handful of individuals could really move to the United States and secure a
highly lucrative pay deal. 162 In Canada, the prevailing view is that only
executives in companies now competing successfully for business in a North
American or global marketplace might be able to leave.' 63 Thus, most Canadian
CEOs have not actively sought opportunities in the United States because many
are "landlocked": they work for small companies that only service the domestic
market.164 The upshot is that, while cross-border hiring is a potential catalyst for
Americanized executive pay, the global market for managerial talent is
characterized by "continuing stickiness."'
' 65
C. Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions
As with the market for managerial talent, growing internationalization of the
market for corporate control could foster a shift in executive compensation.,
66
158. Id. For a mildly dissenting view, see Alexander, supra note 148.
159. Overell, supra note 152.
160. Jan Hack Katz, Competition Breeds Efficiency? Then Open the Executive Suite to the Free
Market, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1997, at B9. Moreover, mindful of security issues, immigration officials
are imposing increasingly strict standards on foreigners seeking to work for U.S. companies. Jennifer
Fried, For Many Business Immigration Lawyers, There's Less Green in Green Cards, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REV., June 20,2003, at 14.
161. On Britain, see, for example, Peter Martin, More than Their Job's Worth, FIN. TIMES, May 15,
1993, at 8; Thin Excuses for Fat Cats, THE INDEP. (London), Mar. 6, 1994, at 20; John Waples,
Boardroom Bonanza, TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), July 16, 2000, § 3, at 9.
On Canada, see Gay, supra note 66; Ann Gibbon, CIBC Opposes Executive Pay Limit, GLOBE & MAIL
(National Edition), Jan. 17, 1997, at B4.
162. Look Out, There's a Monster Coming to Your Annual Meeting, TELEGRAPH, July 25, 2000, at
27; Sally Patten & Jon Ashworth, UK 'Fat Cats' Look on in Envy at Their American Cousins, SUNDAY
TIMES (LONDON), July 15, 2000, at 29; Simon Targett, Heat May be Turned Up, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2000, at FT Director 7; Jane Simms, Has the Milk Gone Sour for Fat Cats?, ACCOUNTANCY (U.K.), Sept.
30, 2002, at 40, 41.
163. David Berman, A Bad Place to be Boss, CAN. Bus., July 1997, at 17; Katherine Gay, Canadian
CEOs Pay Makes it Hard to Attract Top Talent, FIN. POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 32; Janet McFarland,
Managing Compensation, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 5, 1996, at B 17.
164. Bruce Gates, Well-Paid Canadian Executives Facing a 'Taxing' Problem, FIN. POST, May 6,
1991, at 24; Gay, supra note 66.
165, ICGN SUB-COMMIt'TEE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION, supra note 153, 19; see also Martin
Dickson, Pay: It's Not Such a Small World After All, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at 22.
166. On the nature of the market for corporate control, see Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory
of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON UNIV. L. REV. 99, 110-12 (1989).
HeinOnline  -- 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 258 2004
The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay
Though the combined effects of economic uncertainty and political turmoil
have recently taken their toll, 167 cross-border merger and acquisition (M & A)
activity has generally been robust over the past decade.' 68 Reasons include
heightened competitive pressures, improvements in technology and
communications, and the growth of global markets for goods and services. 
169
International M & A activity has potentially profound implications for
executive compensation packages because when companies with different
managerial remuneration arrangements merge, pressure arises to move to a
single pay system. 17 Specifically, so long as a strong U.S. clement is party to a
cross-border merger or acquisition, there will be a shift toward an American-
style compensation scheme.
First consider foreign firms making acquisitions in the United States. If the
American target previously offered lucrative remuneration packages to its
executives, a merger could create huge internal pay inequities. The parent
company might then be forced to resolve the problem by increasing home-
country executive pay. The alternative-slashing salaries of top management in
the United States-would likely be untenable because it would cripple efforts to
recruit new people and retain key incumbent talent. 171 For instance, prior to the
1998 merger between Daimler-Benz AG, a German automobile manufacturer,
and Chrysler Corporation, an American rival, Chrysler's second-ranking
executive made more from salary, bonuses, and share options than the top ten
Daimler-Benz executives combined. 172 This type of disparity led the new
merged entity-Daimler Chrysler-to try to develop an internal pay system that
was equitable on cross-border terms and yet would allow the company to retain
and recruit managers to run the American operations. 73 The key initiative taken
in this regard was to implement a major stock option plan for which 6,000
executives, including those based in Germany, were eligible.'
74
167. Peter Thai Larsen & Lina Saigol, Annus Horribilis for Deal-Making Bankers, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2001, at 19; David Telfer, Uncertainty Taking its Toll on Deals, says KPMG, ABERDEEN PRESS &
JOURNAL, June 30, 2003, at 15.
168. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last US
Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 799 (2000); Fay Hansen, Global Mergers & Acquisitions Explode, Bus.
CREDIT, June 2000, at 22.
169. Abdel M. Agami, Cross-Border Mergers Among Multinational Businesses, MULTINAT'L BUS.
REv., Spring 2001, at 77. Other reasons offered for the increase include the liberalization of international
trade and capital flows. David Allen, Global Mergers, MGMT. ACCT., April 1999, at 50.
170. Fung, supra note 81, at 38.
171. Murphy, supra note 12, at 2497; The Best... and the Rest, supra note 4, at 16; Gross &
Wingerup, supra note 11, at 30; J.E. Richard, Global Executive Compensation: A Look at the Future,
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., May-June 2000, at 35.
172. Cheffins, Metamorphosis, supra note 10, at 508-9; see also Peter Schneider, Scenes from a
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, Magazine, at 44, 47.
173. Fung, supra note 81, at 37.
174. Kemba J. Dunham, Home Disadvantage: WALL ST. J., April 11, 2002, at B12 (noting that
because German law does not require corporations to report individual executive salaries, it is unknown
whether any DaimlerChrysler executive currently working in the U.S. is paid better than the CEO).
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Now consider an American company acquiring a foreign business
enterprise. Given the exceptional nature of managerial remuneration in the
United States, the executives of the acquired company are unlikely to be nearly
as well paid as their American counterparts. If matters remain the same after the
merger, dissatisfaction could arise among top people in the acquired company,
perhaps leading to harmful defections. 175 As a result, pressure will again exist to
move pay in the U.S. direction. Since the presence of a strong American
element in a cross-border merger has this sort of effect and because the United
States is a major player in such transactions, 176 a prompt return to recent levels
of cross-border deal-making should create renewed momentum in favor of U.S.-
style executive remuneration.
D. The Growth of Multinational Enterprise
Cross-border mergers are a manifestation of an even broader trend, the
dramatic increase in the number and size of companies that operate
multinationally. 177 The growth of multinational enterprises has significant
implications for the globalization of executive pay. Business enterprises with
cross-border operations often find it useful to coordinate managerial pay
arrangements around a universal standard because this makes it easier to
organize company-wide systems of promotion and incentivized
compensation. 78 For multinational corporations that in fact make "executive
pay decisions on a worldwide level. .. more uniform executive pay structures
are the result."' 179 Correspondingly, when multinationals headquartered in the
United States set managerial pay in accordance with a universal corporate
policy, Americanization of executive pay will likely ensue.
Thus, when an American multinational adopts a uniform executive
compensation structure, host-country nationals directly employed by the
company will end up having their pay aligned more closely with standards
prevailing in the United States. 8 Also noteworthy, however, will be the effect
on the market for managerial talent in the country in question. Higher pay for
175. Robert A. Romanchek, Executive Compensation in a Global Merger, ACA J., First Q. 1999, at
6.
176. Hansen, supra note 168, at 22-23.
177. Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Governance: The Significance of 'Soft Law' and
International Institutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 669, 672-75 (2000); Gary M. Quinlivan, The
Multilaterals, WORLD & 1, Nov. 2000, at 267.
178. Marc Baranski, Think Globally, Pay Locally: Finding the Right Mix, COMPENSATION &
BENEFITS REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 15, 20-21; Fung, supra note 81, at 38; Mazur, supra note 82.
179. Richard, supra note 171, at 35.
180. HELEN DERESKY, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: MANAGING AcROSS BORDERS AND
CULTURES 366-67 (Prentice Hall, 3d. ed., 2000); Mazur, supra note 82 (making the same point by
referring to a UK parent company). Still, when U.S. multinationals use Americans for top management
positions in foreign subsidiaries, the top executives can often be segregated in terms of their pay. See
Fung, supra note 81, at 41.
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locals hired for top posts by American companies will skew the expectation
scale and pressure domestic companies to introduce equally remunerative
compensation packages so as to attract and retain effective managers. 8 1 For
instance, when American multinationals began awarding growing numbers of
stock options to managers working outside the United States in the 1990s, local
firms were provoked into adopting this type of compensation.'8
2
While some multinationals seek to establish an internationally uniform
executive remuneration structure ("globalizer" companies), others prefer to take
into account domestic compensation norms, national tax considerations, and
other local conditions ("adapter" or "localizer" organizations).1 83 The latter type
of policy will obviously do little to foster the globalization of executive pay.
Organizing managerial pay purely on a country-by-country basis, however, may
not be tenable for multinationals headquartered outside the United States that
have substantial American operations. Specifically, if such a company sets
managerial pay strictly in accordance with local conditions, it would need to
offer remuneration that is competitive stateside in order to recruit or retain
talented managers to run the U.S. division. 184 This, in turn, could cause disquiet
among the parent company's top executives because they might not be earning
as much as their highly paid managerial subordinates in the United States.'
5
Also, the firm's managerial "high-flyers" might lobby noisily for assignments
stateside so as to become entitled to lucrative American-style pay packages and
then insist on retaining their compensation upon returning to the head office.
Faced with such pressures, foreign multinationals operating in the United States
might feel compelled to restructure executive pay at the parent company in ways
that would foster the globalization of executive pay.186
E. Conclusion
How potent are the various market forces which could foster executive pay
convergence? This is a difficult question to answer. More dispersed share
ownership in countries where "core" investors now dominate would likely yield
increasingly lucrative and performance-based managerial pay packages.
181. Murphy, supra note 12, at 2497; Atul Mitra et al., Crossing a Raging River, WORLDATWORK
J., 2d Quarter 2002, at 6.
182. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 3.
183. Fung, supra note 81, at 36, 37-38; Mitra et al., supra note 181, at 6. Cf Duncan Brown, The
Third Way: The Future of Pay and Rewards Strategies in Europe, ACA J., Second Quarter, 2000, at 15,
available at http://www.worldatwork.org (saying that country-based variations in remuneration remain
prevalent in Europe but there are signs of companies evolving towards a "Third Way").
184. Vikas Bajaj, Foreign Firms Attracting Talent With Stock Options, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 19, 1999, at D23.
185. Berman, supra note 163, at 17; Johnston, supra note 6; Lublin, supra note 154 (focusing on the
jealousy that high U.S. pay can generate).
186. Dunham, supra note 174.
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However, it is uncertain whether such ownership patterns will evolve
substantially in the near future. 18 7 Similarly, cross-border mergers and
acquisitions will likely promote the Americanization of managerial
remuneration, though current economic uncertainties mean that it may be some
time before transnational deal activity returns to levels seen in recent years.
Finally, it must be remembered that, in a general sense, market forces may
not wield a decisive influence on the globalization of executive compensation.
Instead, various types of legal regulation could deter companies from making
American-style pay arrangements. 188 Indeed, as we have already seen,
immigration laws are one potential barrier. 8 9 Rules and guidelines promulgated
by private organizations rather than lawmakers ("soft law") could also impede
the globalization of managerial compensation to some degree, as could the
business culture in the countries in which companies operate. The next four
parts of the Article consider these various possibilities in turn, beginning with
an analysis of corporate law.
V. CORPORATE LAW AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF ExEcuTrIvE PAY
A. Direct Regulation
Corporate law encompasses various types of legal rules that might influence
the setting of executive pay. Statutory measures that stipulate specifically how
executive pay arrangements should be structured--"direct regulation"-have
the potential to address the issue in the most forthright manner. Past experiences
in India offer a striking illustration of how far the law might go. The Companies
Act of 1956 introduced various provisions that dictated how management was to
be paid.' 90 For instance, total managerial compensation could not exceed 11%
of a company's net annual profits.191 Also, the remuneration of directors acting
in a managerial capacity could not be increased without government
approval. 92 The government issued guidelines for permissible increases,
including a ceiling on annual pay apparently based upon the prevailing salary of
the President of India.
193
The law on executive pay was liberalized somewhat in India in the early
187. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
188. Mitra et al., supra note 181.
189. See Fried, supra note 160 and accompanying text.
190. Companies Act, No. 1 (1956) (India).
191. Companies Act, No. 1 §§ 198, 309. On the origins of the provision and for background, see A.
RAMAIYA, GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT (ACT I OF 1956 AMENDED UP TO DATE), li, lii, 15, 22, 337-40,
503-8 (Madras Law Journal Office, 6th ed., 1971) [hereinafter RAMAIYA, 6th ed.].
192. Companies Act, No. I § 310. For background on this provision, see RAMAIYA, 6th ed., supra
note 191, at 1, 22, 508-10.
193. On the guidelines, see RAMAIYA, 6th ed., supra note 191, at 510-12. On the link to the
President's salary, see Ramaswamy et al., supra note 133, at 182.
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1990S.194 This relaxation brought the country more into line with the global
norm, as direct regulation of managerial compensation is the exception rather
than the rule in industrialized countries. Indeed, corporate law typically does not
dictate in any way the nature or scope of executive remuneration.'
95
Nevertheless, in some countries, corporate law does directly regulate
executive pay.196 One approach has been to prohibit a company from paying
more than a designated percentage of annual earnings to its directors; Argentina
and the Philippines have laws of this sort. 19 7 Also, certain jurisdictions, such as
Australia 98 and Germany, 199 stipulate that executive pay must be "reasonable."
A similar restriction exists in Brazil, where the remuneration of a corporation's
administrators (essentially its directors and executive officers) must be set with
due regard for the professional experience of the administrators, their reputation,
their duties, and the market value of their services.
200
194. Ramaswamy et al., supra note 133, at 182. Essentially, unless a company is unprofitable, it is
free to work out a suitable remuneration package for its managerial personnel within the limit of a
designated percentage of net profits. A. RAMAIYA, GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT, 1738-44, 2435-50,
2732-61 (Wadhwa & Co., 15th ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAMAIYA, 15th ed.].
195. Eddy Wymeersch, Current Company Law Reform Initiatives in the OECD Countries:
Challenges and Opportunities (2001) (unpublished manuscript at 26, on file with authors) (discussing
Europe); see also Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44, s. 125 (Can.); R.C. BEUTHIN
& S.M. LuiZ, BEUTHIN'S BASIC COMPANY LAW, 193-94, 211 (Butterworths, 3d ed., 2000) (discussing
South Africa); Ichiro Kawamoto et al., Japan, in R. Blanpain & K. Geens, eds., INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 175-76 (Aspen Publishers, 1998)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA] (discussing Japan); WALTER WOON, COMPANY LAW 251-
54 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2d ed., 1997) (discussing Singapore).
196. With respect to the United States, at first glance, sanctions that can be imposed under § 304 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 serve to regulate executive pay. Upon closer examination, however, this
does not appear the case. By virtue of statutory amendments made by this Act, a public company's CEO
and CFO must certify the corporation's periodic financial statements. If a company's financial statements
have to be restated, §304 of the Act provides that the CEO and CFO must pay back bonuses, incentive-
based compensation, and equity compensation received during the twelve-month period following the
initial filing of the impugned financials. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2004). Since this provision can operate
regardless of how managerial services contracts might be structured, it appears to function more as a
sanction for the filing of inaccurate financial statements than as a method for regulating executive
remuneration.
197. In Argentina the amount is 25% of earnings (5% if no dividend is distributed) and in the
Philippines it is 10% of net income before tax. See INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 1, 4, 168 (Thomas Learning, 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK]; Paul van
Nieuwenhove, Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA; supra note 167, at 86.
198, A public company is prohibited from providing remuneration to managers that is not
"reasonable" unless the arrangement has been approved by the shareholders. See Corporations Act 2001,
No. 50 (2001) § 211 (Austl.). See also Corporations Amendment (Repayment of Directors' Bonuses) Act
2003, No. 25 (2003) (Austl.) (amending various sections of the Corporations Act 2001 to permit the
recovery in bankruptcy proceedings of unreasonable director-related payments).
199. In Germany, most firms that distribute shares to the public do business as a stock corporation or
"AG," and an AG's management board will be staffed by senior full-time executives. The legislation
governing such companies stipulates that the aggregate remuneration of each member of the management
board of an AG must bear a reasonable relationship to duties of the particular member and to the financial
condition of the company. See German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz or AktG), of Sept. 6, 1965
(Legal Gazette 11089) § 87, I.
200. Eduardo S. Neto & Jorge E.P. Levy, Brazil, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
195, at 62-63.
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Detailed regulations such as those that existed in India would likely
constrain a move towards Americanized executive pay.201 However, the
restrictions of the sort just outlined are unlikely to pose a serious obstacle. For
instance, Argentina's chief executives have traditionally been among the most
highly paid in the world,202 demonstrating that laws limiting director pay to a
percentage of profits apparently do not prevent lucrative compensation
arrangements.20 3 Similarly, in Australia, following the introduction of its
"reasonable" remuneration rule in 1992, the country experienced an "enormous
and well-publicized escalation in the rewards for CEOs."
20 4
Consistent with the general pattern, in Germany, the requirement that
compensation reasonably correspond to the services provided has caused few
logistical difficulties. 205 On the other hand, the German provision did provide a
legal foundation for "breach of trust" charges brought in 2003 as a result of
controversial payments made to senior executives of Mannesmann AG after the
company opted to abandon stubborn opposition to a hostile takeover.20 6 There
was speculation that, if the prosecution succeeded, "Germany [would have]
become a scorched earth for international executives" who might be candidates
for jobs in the country. 20 7  Dismissal of the charges, however, seems
imminent.0°
B. Breach of Duty and Related Causes ofAction
Even if legislation does not stipulate the structure of executive pay
arrangements, judicial regulation remains a possibility. 20 9 Usually, a company's
board of directors is assigned the lead role in determining executive pay,2 10 with
201. See Ashok H. Advani, From the Publisher, BUS. INDIA, June 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL
17108218 (discussing how regulation affected executive pay in India).
202. See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 20, 24 and accompanying text.
203. Since directors in Argentina are not allowed to have service contracts, it may be that
Argentina's well-paid executives choose not to serve on the board- INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra
note 197, at 8-
204. Henry Bosch, Looking in the CEO's Pay Packet Has a Cost, SHARES MAG, Oct. 1998, at 61.
For statistics, see Mitchell, supra note 13. The statutory provision was first introduced by the Corporate
Law Reform Act, No. 210 (1992) § 2 (Austl.).
205. Walter Oppenhoff & Thomas 0. Verhoeven, The Stock Corporation, in Dennis Campbell ed.,
BusINEss TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY §24.03[l][c][ii][B] (Matthew Bender, 1999). For background on
why the relevant provision does not have a major practical impact, see Cheffins, supra note 10, at 526-
27.
206. Germany's Fat Cats on Trial, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 2003, at 86.
207. Andrew Bulkeley, Deutsche Bank Chief Charged, DAILY DEAL, Feb. 26, 2003, available at
2003 WL 4166932.
208. Patrick Jenkins, Mannesmann Acquittals Likely, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at 19.
209. For a summary of why this is the case, see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating
Challenges to Executive Compensation: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 599-600, 602-
03 (2001).
210. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 660; JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 11.4 (Aspen
Publishers, 1998); INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 197, at 15, 26, 76, 124, 147, 162, 206.
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a "supervisory" board in charge when a two-tier board structure is in place (as in
Germany, for example). 211 Decisions directors make in this context can
potentially be impugned on the basis of breach of duties of care, loyalty, or good
faith.' 2 In the United States, for example, derivative litigation has been used in
numerous instances to challenge managerial remuneration arrangements.
21 3
These suits are more frequently successful in closely held corporations, but even
in publicly traded firms they provide something of a check on managerial
remuneration.
214
Still, while the judiciary can theoretically regulate executive pay in certain
instances, it is highly unlikely that suits for breach of duty will significantly
affect any trend toward the globalization of executive pay. Certainly, in the
United States itself, litigation has done little to stop dramatic overall increases in
managerial remuneration.2 15 Part of the reason is that American judges have
typically been reluctant to meddle in corporate policymaking. 6 Their
colleagues in other countries likely will share this deferential attitude. 1 7
Moreover, even if judges in a particular jurisdiction were prepared to rule
that awarding overly generous remuneration constitutes a breach of duties owed
to a company, significant procedural constraints would probably deter litigation.
In various civil law countries, shareholders do not have any right to bring
derivative actions.2 18 In others, those interested in bringing proceedings must
own a minimum designated percentage of shares (5% or 10%, for example) to
obtain standing.219 In a common law country, on the other hand, case law can
offer exceptions to the principle that breaches of duty by directors must be
litigated by the company. 2 2 These exceptions, however, are narrowly focused
211. On Germany, see AktG, §§ 87(1), 112. Even if there is a one-tier board, in some countries a
remuneration committee composed primarily of outside directors will typically take the lead role in
setting executive pay: Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 122, at 285, 298 (discussing the United States and
Britain).
212. On the law on these duties in various countries, see S.J. Berwin & Co. eds., DIRECTORS'
RESPONSIBILITIES IN EUROPE 8, 16,25-27, 34-35, 41-42, 49-51, 57, 67, 74 (1997); BETTY M. Ho, PUBLIC
COMPANIES AND THEIR EQUITY SECURITIES ch. 10 (Kluwer Law International, 1998) (Hong Kong);
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 197, at 69-70 (Japan); WOON, supra note 195, ch. 8 (Singapore
and Malaysia); Neto & Levy, supra note 200, at 65-67 (Brazil).
213. For empirical evidence on such litigation, see Thomas & Martin, supra note 209, at 573-93.
214. ld at 586-87. On publicly traded companies, see, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
215. Thomas & Martin, supra note 209, at 601-02, 605.
216. Id. at 601-02.
217. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 674 (UK); Cheffins, supra note 10, at 527-28 (Germany); Zoher
Adenwala, Directors' Generous Remuneration: To Be or Not to Be Paid, 3 BOND L. REv. 25, 30 (1991);
Benjamin Alarie, Executive Compensation and Tax Policy: Lessons for Canada from the Experience of
the United States in the 1990s, 61 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 39, 62-63 (2003).
218. Matthias W. Stecher et al., General Report, in Matthias W. Schecher ed., PROTECTION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 1, 9-10 (Kluwer Law International, 1997).
219. Id. The position is the same in Brazil: Neto & Levy, supra note 200, at 65.
220. On England, see Foss v. Harbottle 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Q.B. 1843); Edwards v. Halliwell, 2 All
E.R. 1064 (Eng. C.A.). Jurisdictions where the same basic rules apply include Ireland (Stecher, supra
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and are usually of little assistance to a disgruntled minority shareholder.221 In
some common law jurisdictions such as Canada, South Africa, and Australia,
the standing rules have been liberalized somewhat by statute."' Still, the fact
that recovery is the right of the company rather than the shareholder conducting
the litigation will likely cause investors to conclude that suing is more trouble
than it is worth.223
In a number of common law jurisdictions, the logistical difficulties just
discussed can be overcome by statutory measures that authorize the judiciary to
grant a remedy to a shareholder unfairly prejudiced by a company's actions.
224
With such a provision, a minority shareholder can sue without having to finesse
the procedural constraints associated with derivative litigation. 225 Also, since
recovery is the right of the shareholder seeking relief rather than the company,
the remedy granted can be tailored to the applicant's personal considerations.
226
Still, while there is case law to indicate that excessive remuneration can qualify
as "unfairly prejudicial" conduct, 227 the judiciary has proved reluctant to grant
relief under the relevant statutory provisions where a company is traded on the
stock market. 228 As a result, proceedings brought under the unfair prejudice
remedy are unlikely to significantly affect those businesses in which
globalization of executive pay is most likely to occur, namely publicly traded
companies.
note 218, at 9), Hong Kong (HO, supra note 212, at 629-40); Malaysia and Singapore (WOON, supra note
195, at 327, 343, noting that Singapore's statutory derivative action is only available companies that are
not publicly traded).
221. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 315-16, 665-66.
222. BETrrHIN & LLIZ, supra note 195, at 155-56 (South Africa); Brian R. Cheffins, Reforming the
Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects, I COMPANY FIN. & INSOLV. L. REV.
227, 234-35 (1997) (Canada); Corporations Act 2001, ss. 236-237 (Austl.).
223. Cheffins, supra note 222, at 256-58. Cf Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence
from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (2001) (noting that Japanese shareholders have weak incentives to
bring derivative litigation but explaining the launching of proceedings of this type by reference to
attorney motives).
224. See, e.g., Companies Act 1985, c. 6, s. 459 (Eng.); DENIS H. PETERSON, SHAREHOLDER
REMEDIES IN CANADA § 18.15 (Butterworths, 1989) (outlining Canadian statutory provisions);
Corporations Act 2001, s. 232 (Austl.); Ho, supra note 212, at 657-58 (outlining the position in Hong
Kong); WOON, supra note 195, at 158-60 (discussing Singapore and Malaysia).
225. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 345.
226. Cheffins, supra note 222, at 242.
227. PETERSON, supra note 190, § 18.96, Andrew Defina et al., What is Reasonable Remuneration
for Corporate Officers? An Empirical Investigation Into the Relationship Between Pay and Performance
in the Largest Australian Companies, 12 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 341, 342-44 (1994).
228. Ho, supra note 212, at 662, 667; J.H. FARRAR & B.M. HANNIGAN, FARRAR'S COMPANY LAW
450-51 (Butterworths, 4th ed., 1998). Cf KEVIN P. McGu1NNESs, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 966-67 (Butterworths, 1999); G.P. Stapledon, Use of the
Oppression Provision in Listed Companies in Australia and the United Kingdom, 67 AUSTL. L.J. 575,
576-78 (1993). In the United States, the equivalent statutory provisions often restrict applications so they
can only be made in closely held companies. See legislation discussed in F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT
B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.27 (Thompson/West. 3d ed., 2000).
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C. Shareholder Voting
Legally mandated shareholder voting constitutes another constraint that
corporate law can impose on executive pay arrangements. Again, a company's
board of directors most often will have responsibility for setting executive
pay.229 At the same time, though, corporate legislation may stipulate that the
shareholders have some say. For instance, in certain jurisdictions, laws
governing the issuance of equity and corporate "buy-backs" of shares mandate
that shareholders pass a resolution endorsing the creation of stock options for
top management before such compensation can be granted. 30 Also, in 2002,
Britain enacted measures requiring shareholders in publicly traded companies to
vote annually on executive pay arrangements. 231 Still, the vote is advisory only,
in the sense that a "no" verdict has no effect on entitlements under validly
negotiated managerial services contracts.
2 32
Another approach some countries use to involve shareholders in determining
executive pay is to give those owning equity the right to fix yearly the total
remuneration to be awarded to the directors. 233 This apparently sweeping power
can be greatly qualified, however, since the packages upon which shareholders
vote may not encompass managerial services contracts. 234  Under such
circumstances, any veto the shareholders have will only relate to compensation
awarded to individuals acting qua director (fees for attending meetings, for
example).
The intention underlying the various statutory provisions giving owners of
corporate equity a vote presumably is to impose a check on excessive
229. Supra note 131 and related discussion.
230. See supra notes 84 and 90 and accompanying text (discussing Germany and Japan). The
position is the same, for example, in France: Francois Marty & Jean-Francois Dumas, France Opens up
the Options, 8 INT'L TAX REV., July 1997, at 52.
231. Companies Act 1985, s. 241A, introduced by Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations
2002, S12002/1986, § 7.
232. Rory Cray and David Cullington, Directors' Remuneration Reports, PRACTICAL L. COMPANY,
Nov. 2002, at 29, 31.
233. ROBERT BAXT ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CORPORATIONS & SECURITIES REPORTER $ 41, 620 (North
Ryde, NSW: CCH Australia, 1990) (discussing Australia); JEAN-PIERRE LE GALL AND PAUL MOREL,
FRENCH COMPANY LAW 104 (Longman, 2d ed., 1992) (discussing France); M.T. Kreek & S.E. Eisma,
Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 197, at 60 (discussing the Netherlands); Rolf
Skog, The Swedish Corporate Governance System and International Corporate Governance Debate - A
Letter to Katherine, in Mette Neville & Karsten E. Sorensen eds., THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF
COMPANIES AND COMPANY LAWS 123, 128 (DJOF Publishing, 2001) (discussing Sweden); Kawamoto et
al., supra note 195, at 176 (discussing Japan); Neto & Levy, supra note 200, at 63 (discussing Brazil);
van Nicuwenhove, supra note 197, at 86 (discussing Argentina).
234. In Brazil, this is the case with administrators who are hired as employees rather than being
elected by the shareholders: E-mail from Rachel Sztajn, Univ. of Sao Paolo, to Brian Cheffins (on file
with authors). In the Netherlands, the corporate constitution can displace the rule that shareholders must
vote and the board in fact does normally settle the terms of the service contracts of managing directors: P.
SANDERS, DUTCH COMPANY LAW 72 (Oyez, 1977). In France, the directors settle all executive service
contracts. See LE GALL & MOREL, supra note 233, at 114.
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managerial remuneration.235 Yet, regardless of how the particular rules are
formulated, it is doubtful that they can ever act as the safeguard that regulators
seemingly expect them to be. First consider companies with a controlling
shareholder. Statutory measures requiring remuneration issues to be put to a
vote may effectively give the dominant investor a veto over changes falling
within the scope of the relevant rules. On the other hand, a "core" shareholder
will be well-situated to influence executive pay regardless of whether a
shareholder resolution is specifically required or not.
236
What will the situation be in companies with dispersed share ownership?
The experience in the United States and Britain, where a diffuse share
ownership pattern is typical for publicly traded companies, provides a possible
guide. In these two countries, the available empirical evidence suggests that
shareholder voting only functions as a potential check on executive pay when
arrangements deviate far from the norm.2 3 7 Again, certain countries in which
concentrated share ownership is the norm for large business enterprises may be
shifting towards the more diffuse Anglo-American pattern. 238 The experience in
the United States and Britain implies that this sort of shift would not cause
shareholder voting to emerge as a significant determinant of executive pay.
D. Restrictions on the Distribution of Shares to Executives
When a company has established a stock option plan for its executives, it
must be able to satisfy its obligations when the options are exercised. The most
straightforward way to do this is either to issue new shares to the option holders
or to repurchase outstanding equity to sell to the executives. 39 In many
jurisdictions, however, the issuance of new equity is heavily regulated, and
share buy-backs may be prohibited except under special circumstances."' Such
regulations, therefore, may make it impractical for companies to grant stock
options.
The German experience is illustrative. The country's stock corporations are
235. See, e.g., Kawamoto et al., supra note 195, at 175-76 (discussing Japan).
236. Supra note 132 and accompanying text.
237. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 122, at 43; Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, When is
Enough, Enough? Market Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the Subsequent Impact on
CEO Compensation, J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2004). The introduction of a mandatory advisory vote in
Britain in 2002 does not appear to have changed the situation since only in very rare instances have
shareholders voted down what has been proposed. See Clay Harris, Aegis Shareholders Reject Chiefs
Deal, FIN. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at I (describing Aegis Group, a marketing services company, as joining
"a select club of UK companies" that had suffered a "no" vote).
238. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
239. Cheffins, Metamorphosis, supra note 10, at 14.
240. See, e.g., Shaun W. Thorpe ed., COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE B62, D60-61, EC 88, F50, H48,
P42, Q66 (1995) (discussing pre-emptive ights in various European countries and European Union
company law measures governing share repurchases); WOON, supra note 195, at 592-95 (discussing
share repurchases in Singapore and Malaysia); van Nicuwenhove, supra note 197, at 66, 70 (discussing
pre-emptive rights and share repurchase rules in Argentina).
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only permitted to issue and repurchase shares under tightly prescribed
circumstances, and satisfying option rights exercised by top executives
traditionally did not qualify as a legally valid exception. 2 4 As a result, firms
could only make stock options available to executives by granting bonds that
could be converted into shares of the company (convertible bonds) or that had a
warrant attached granting the right to acquire shares upon exercise (warrant
bonds). 24 2 The situation was similar in Japan, Finland, and South Korea.
243
Since stock options are a pivotal aspect of the U.S. pay paradigm, rules
effectively precluding companies from using this form of remuneration
inevitably will at least partially hamper the Americanization of managerial
compensation. Still, due to deregulation, such restrictions are of diminishing
importance. During the late 1990s, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Finland
all liberalized their statutory rules to make it easier for corporations to grant
stock options to executives. 244 In these countries, deregulation was not fully
implemented: shareholder approval still must be obtained before a company can
issue or buy back shares and thereby transfer equity to executives who have
exercised stock options.2 45 Still, the law now constitutes less of a deterrent to the
Americanization of executive pay than previously. Indeed, large numbers of
German and Korean companies have taken advantage of reform to begin
granting stock option plans.24 6 This has also been the case in Japan, though
247concerns persist that the law remains too restrictive.
241. Ingrid Kalisch, Stock Options: Will the Upcoming Amendment of the German Stock
Corporation Act Facilitate Their Introduction by German Stock Corporations?, 9 INT'L CORP. COMM. L.
REv. 111, 112-14 (1998); Uwe Seibert, Control and Transparency in Business (KonTraG): Corporate
Governance Reform in Germany, 10 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 70, 74 (1999).
242. Kalisch, supra note 241, at 112-14.
243. See generalty The Best.. and the Rest, supra note 4, at 13. On Japan, see Akira Kawamura,
Introduction of Stock Option, 12 J. INT'L BANKING L. N-226 (1997); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for
Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Governance Debate, 91
NW. U. L. REv. 865, 890 (1999). As both authors note, in 1995 the legal regime was partially liberalized
for new businesses approved by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry but only a small number
of companies sought such approval.
244 The Best ... and the Rest, supra note 4, at 13. For example, in South Korea, regulations dealing
with the issuance of shares were amended so as to permit companies to satisfy their obligations under
stock option plans (Kon-Sik Kim & Chong-Kee Lee, South Korea in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 167, at 85). The same was done in Germany and Japan and changes were also made to the
rules governing share buy-backs. See Maximilian Grub, The Concept of Corporate Governance and
Recent Developments in Germany, CORP. GOVERNANCE INT'L, issue #4, at 20, 24-25; Florian Haase,
Stock Option Schemes in Germany, 23 COMPANY LAW. 223, 223 (2002); Kawamura, supra note 243, at
N-226-27 (Japan).
245. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
246. Woodruff, supra note 139; 105 Listed Firms Introduce Stock Options This Year, KOREA
HERALD, Oct. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27394960.
247. On the growing popularity of stock options, see sources cited supra note 91. On concerns with
the state of the law, see Alexandra Hamey, Cracks Widen in Japan's Commercial Code, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2000, at 25.
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E. Disclosure
"Direct regulation," shareholder litigation, shareholder voting requirements,
and rules governing the distribution of corporate equity thus seem unlikely to be
important determinants of the Americanization of executive pay. On the other
hand, another set of corporate law rules could constitute a significant variable.
These are measures requiring periodic public disclosure of corporate executives'
compensation packages.
248
The extent to which disclosure of executive pay is mandated varies widely
around the world. In the United States, under Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rules, when a corporation's management team contacts
investors to solicit proxy votes for the stockholders' annual meeting, the
corporation must send a highly detailed report on executive pay prepared by the
board of directors or a compensation committee acting on behalf of the board.
The report, in addition to describing the corporation's general approach to
executive pay, must offer a detailed breakdown of compensation arrangements
for the CEO and the next four highest-paid executive officers.249 Britain,
Canada, and Australia have disclosure rules that match the SEC standards or
come fairly close.250 France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden also regulate
the topic quite closely; in each jurisdiction, companies must provide
individualized pay details for top executives.
25 1
In contrast, disclosure regulation elsewhere tends to be lax. Indeed, some
248. Prospectus regulation is also potentially relevant on the disclosure front when a company is
planning to make stock option grants or create incentive schemes where equity will be distributed to
executives. See Mary Carter & Mary Bryson, International Employee Stock Plans: Part 1, GLOBAL
COuNS., June 2001, at 21; Jocelyn Mitchell, Share Schemes and the International Company, IN-HOUSE
LAW., May 1997, at 43. Prospectus regulation is not dealt with in detail here because the experience in
America suggests that its presence or absence is unlikely to affect significantly the spread of U.S.-style
executive pay. In the United States, the relevant rules are potentially rigorous (Carter & Bryson, supra, at
24) but stock option plans are nevertheless used more widely than they are in any other country.
249. Items 402(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (k) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (k)
(2000). To be more precise, the board is obliged to describe the corporation's general approach to
executive pay and, in a table organized according to SEC specifications, specify how much was paid to
each of the five most highly paid executives in the form of salary, bonuses, share options, and other
designated categories. The directors must also prepare a performance graph allowing investors to
evaluate the corporation's shareholder return over a five year period in comparison with a "peer group"
index and with a well-known stock market index such as the Standard and Poor's 500: Item 402(l) of
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 229.402(l) (2000).
250. On the fact that disclosure standards in Britain and Canada are fairly close to those which exist
in the United States, see Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at F643; Xianming Zhou, CEO Pay, Firm
Size, and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Canada, 33 CAN. J. ECON. 213, 216 (2000). On the law
in Australia, see Michael Quinn, The Unchangeables - Director and Executive Remuneration Disclosure
in Australia, 10 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 1, 92 (1999).
In Britain, until 2002, disclosure of executive pay was regulated by the listing rules that apply to publicly
traded companies. There has now been a shift to a statutory format. See Companies Act, 1985, s. 234B,
schedule 7A, introduced by Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), Statutory Instrument
2002/1986, §§ 3, 9.
251. Ferrarini et al., supra note 89, at 20-24.
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jurisdictions do not have any reporting requirements at all. 252 More commonly,
corporations eligible for stock market listing must identify aggregate director
remuneration. 253 These companies are not required, however, to publish specific
details on each director's remuneration, to break down the types of
compensation, or to otherwise offer details on performance-related pay.
254
The approach which a country takes towards disclosure of executive pay
will likely exert some influence on any possible shift toward American-style
executive pay. Anglo-American institutional investors are keen on remuneration
schemes that give management incentives to maximize shareholder value, and
might be expected to promote this agenda globally.2 55 Disclosure regulation
could affect their ability to do so since the availability of data on executive pay
will determine to some degree the costs of shareholder monitoring. 256 The
comments offered by a former securities regulator when the Canadian province
of Ontario bolstered disclosure regulation in 1993 make the point well: "Good
corporate governance relies on an informed and active investor community. In
some respects, this legislation recognizes their legitimate need for information
that enables them to relate management's performance to the performance of the
company.,257 Indeed, the available Canadian empirical and anecdotal evidence
suggests that enhanced disclosure regulation had the effect predicted and helped
to cause a shift towards incentivized managerial pay in publicly traded
companies.
258
In additional to fostering incentive-oriented compensation, greater
disclosure may facilitate a shift towards the U.S. pay model by accelerating
increases in executive remuneration.259 As Charles Elson, an American
252 David Woodruff, A Vanishing European Taboo, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A28.
253. See, e g., Ferrarini et al., supra note 89, 24-29 (describing arrangements in Germany, Austria,
Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Portugal); INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK,
supra note 197, at 4, 77, 94, 106, 201 (discussing Argentina, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South
Korea).
254. This point has been made in relation to Germany by Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate
Governance: Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in
Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 236 (1999), (making this point in relation to Germany though it
apparently applies generally).
255. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
256. Ferrarini et al., supra note 89, at 14-15; see Edward M. lacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on
Executive Compensation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489, 497-501 (1998).
257. Quoted in lacobucci, supra note 256, at 497.
258. id. at 502-3; Yun M. Park ct al., Executive Pay and the Disclosure Environment, 24 J. FIN. RES.
347 (2001). Note, though, that research conducted in New Zealand, which bolstered executive pay
disclosure somewhat in the early 1990s, does not reveal the same pattern. See Aleksandar Andjelkovic et
al., Public Disclosure of Executive Compensation: Do Shareholders Need to Know? (unpublished
working paper, on file with authors, 2000); Fayez A. Elayan, Executive Incentive Compensation
Schemes and Their Impact on Corporate Performance: Evidence from New Zealand Since Legal
Disclosure Requirements became Effective (2001) (unpublished working paper) (on file with authors).
259. See lacobucci, supra note 256, at 504-17 (discussing somewhat different versions of the thesis
presented here); Mark J. Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1,23-24 (2000).
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academic specializing in corporate governance, has observed: "The normal
trend is the more that's out there about how much people get, the more they
get. ,260 To elaborate, when detailed disclosure is mandated, both managers and
board members who set executive pay will be able to find out readily the
"market rate" offered by competitors in the same industrial sector and by firms
of a similar size. Therefore, the executives of a company paying below the norm
will be fully aware of their inferior position in the compensation hierarchy and
they may seek adjustments accordingly. A perceived loss of social status could
fuel their demands on this count. 26 1 Those who set executive remuneration
might well be sympathetic to such claims, particularly if a company's frugal
compensation packages are perceived as a tacit admission that the management
team is "below average." 262 Fears that valued executives will defect to rivals
offering more generous terms will also likely stoke higher pay.
263
If all companies ultimately seek to match or exceed the "market rate," the
inevitable result will be an upward "ratchet" in pay.264 Consistent with this
reasoning, some speculate that British, Canadian, and Australian lawmakers'
introduction of more rigorous executive pay disclosure requirements in the
1990s resulted in accelerated increases in managerial remuneration. 26 5 Empirical
work using Canadian data indicates that such suspicions are well-founded.266
It is ironic that increased disclosure might contribute to an American-style
executive pay spiral because those who fret that top managers are paid "too
much" are often keen supporters of reform. 2 67 For instance, when Ontario
bolstered executive pay disclosure in 1993, the left-wing administration then in
office was concerned about the excesses of free-market economics. One
columnist in a leading Canadian newspaper suggested that the "real motivation"
for reform "was to plunge the population into an egalitarian snit over the money
paid to the capitalist scoundrels who run private-sector corporations. " 268 Matters
260. Quoted in Patrick McGeehan, Disclosing Pay of Executives Often Leads to Raises, N.Y. TIMES,
October 11, 2003, at C5.
261. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1021, 1041-42 (1999).
262. Room at the Top (Editorial), FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at 19.
263. Peter Rodgers, The Greenbury Effect: Is it Pushing Pay Higher?, INDEP. (London), Apr. 26,
1996, at 21.
264. See id-; see also How Greenbury Has Boosted Executive Excess, THE INDEP. (London), June
29, 1996, at 17.
265. On Britain, see Rodgers, supra note 263; THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4.5 (1998) [hereinaftler HAMPEL REPORT;
the Committee was chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel]. On Canada, see lacobucci, supra note 256, at 512;
Barbara Shecter, Canadian CEOs Enjoy Average 8% Hike in Compensation, FIN. POST, Sept. 25, 1996,
at 5. On Australia, see Saville, supra note 93.
266. Park Executive Pay, supra note 128.
267. See, e.g., CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 699; Rodgers, supra note 263; Power Politics, American
Style, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 1995, at 67.
268. Terence Corcoran, Executive Pay is Not About Social Justice, GLOBE & MAIL, May 14, 1994,
at B2; see also Terence Corcoran, Raestone Kops Storm Executive Suite, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 16, 1993,
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did not quite work out as planned. In 2001, the same columnist observed: "So
far, the only impact of the disclosure has been to drive compensation higher as
companies now compete more aggressively for talent.,
269
If extensive disclosure regulation does indeed provide a hospitable platform
for American-style executive pay arrangements, recent legislative trends are
potentially very significant. For instance, rules requiring French, Italian, and
Dutch companies to disclose the pay of top corporate officials on an
individualized basis have all been introduced in the past few years.270 Moreover,
additional changes are in the making. The Towers Perrin stock options study
discussed earlier anticipates moderate or significant changes to the disclosure
laws in sixteen of the twenty-two jurisdictions covered.27t Perhaps, then,
"secrecy is on the way out for executive pay."272 If so, reform may, perhaps
somewhat counter-intuitively, foster a shift towards the lucrative performance-
oriented compensation packages prevalent in the United States.
VI. OTHER LEGISLATION
A. Tax
Regulations outside the realm of corporate law rules could also affect the
globalization of executive pay. Tax rules constitute one example. To illustrate,
income tax rates to which executives are subject likely will influence whether
the lucrative managerial compensation associated with the United States
becomes increasingly commonplace elsewhere. All else being equal, corporate
executives should be more highly paid in a country where the top marginal tax
rate (the rate applicable to any further taxable income) is low. Executives will
value generous remuneration more highly in a liberal tax environment because
they will be able to keep more of what they earn. Since a typical company will
tailor compensation arrangements to match managerial preferences, a lower
income tax rate should therefore be correlated with higher executive pay. 273 The
available historical and empirical evidence indicates that the two are indeed
274linked. Tax rules may also influence the use of stock options. Towers
at B2.
269. Terence Corcoran, Executive Hunting Season, NAT'L POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at C19.
270. Ferrarini et al., supra note 89, 20-22; Growing Transparency in France About Chief
Executives'Pay, LES ECHOS, May 3, 2001, at 1.
271. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 78, at 15.
272. Woodruff, supra note 139 (quoting the proprietor of a U.S.-based corporate governance
consultancy).
273. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 704.
274. Id. at 704 (discussing the history in the United States and Britain); John M. Abowd & Michael
L. Bognanno, International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation, in Richard B.
Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz eds., DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCTURES 67, 85-87, 91-
92, 95 (University of Chicago Press, 1995). For additional supporting anecdotal evidence, see Margaret
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Perrin's 2001 study of stock options cited taxation as a key determinant of stock
option implementation in a majority of the countries covered. 275 This finding is
consistent with speculation that unfavorable treatment under personal income
tax laws accounts for the relatively unimportant role of stock options outside the
United States. 27 6 The experience in a number of countries confirms that tax rules
can matter. In Britain, for example, tax changes carried out in the 1980s are
often cited as being a catalyst for the current popularity of executive share
options. 27 7 Over the past decade, Japan, India, and a number of continental
European jurisdictions have restructured their tax rules so as to reduce the tax
burden for an employee whose employer grants stock options.2 78 These reforms
have reputedly encouraged the awarding of this type of compensation.279
Work done by economists John Abowd and David Boganno suggests,
however, that the importance of tax rules cannot be taken for granted. Using
data from the period 1984-1992, they examined how stock options were taxed in
twelve countries with the aim of discovering whether differences in tax rules
correlated with the popularity of stock-based incentive pay. The study
concluded that tax treatment of stock options did not explain in any meaningful
way the proportion of stock options relative to other types of remuneration.
2 8
0
Abowd and Boganno's findings need to be qualified, however, in that the
position of corporations granting stock options was not taken into account. The
experience in the United States shows why this is a significant consideration.
Under American tax law, executives' gains from exercising share options are
typically deductible from corporate profits as an ordinary business expense.
2
81
Lyons, Australia's Top Executives: Are They Paid Too Much, Bus. REV. WKLY., Nov. 16, 1990, at 52;
Lublin, supra note 64; David Woodruff, Across Europe, CEOs Get No Respect, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2002, at A9 (discussing the impact of high rates of income tax on executive pay in Denmark).
275. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 78, at 10.
276. Belgium Revamps Stock Options, 10 INT'L TAX REV. 5 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Belgium
Revamps]; Chwialkowska, supra note 146; Kevin J. Delaney & David Wessel, Lumpy Gravy: Suppose
Stock Options Involved More Pain than Financial Gain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1999, at Al; Mohan
Monteiro & Keyur Shah, India Clears the Wayfor Stock Options, 11 INT'L TAX REV. 17 (Dec. 1999/Jan.
2000); Tully, supra note 58.
277. Don Egginton et al., Executive and Employee Share Options: Taxation. Dilution and
Disclosure, 23 ACCT. & BuS. RES. 363 (1993); Kay, supra note 82; Tully, supra note 58.
278. STOCK OPTIONS (S.J. Berwin & Co., 1999); Monteiro & Shah, supra note 276; Bob Zukis,
Japan and USA Compared, BENEFITS & COMPENSATION INT'L, Sept. 1, 1997, at 9; European Private
Equity and Venture Capital Association Special Paper, at 17, 19, 23, 25, 27, 31 (on file with authors)
(describing changes enacted in a variety of European countries).
279. Belgium Revamps, supra note 276; Jill Eswick, Relative Values, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, June 15,
2001, available at 2001 WL 7984504; Woodruff, supra note 139; Zukis, supra note 278, at 6. Spain is
an exception to the typical pattern since there has been tax reform recently but this did not liberalize the
relevant rules. Delaney & Wessel, supra note 276.
280. Abowd & Bognano, supra note 274, at 92-95. Smith and Watts reached a similar conclusion
in their analysis of the tax effects of executive compensation in the United States. Smith & Watts, supra
note 81, at 361.
281. I.R.C. § 83(h); Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at 665; Brian J. Hall & Jeffry B. Liebman,
The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL'Y ECON. 1, 7-9 (2001). By virtue of section
422(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, a tax deduction is not available to a corporation that awards
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Thus, when a senior manager exercises stock options, the corporation receives a
deduction equal to the difference between the market price of the shares and the
exercise price. The American position is very much the exception rather than
the rule. In other countries, a company generally cannot treat gains from
exercising share options as deductible, since no out-of-pocket expense is
incurred.282 Conyon and Murphy's study of CEO pay in America and Britain
suggests that this difference in tax treatment accounts in part for the greater
popularity of executive share options in the United States.
283
Though the tax status of corporations might affect the use of stock options,
it cannot be taken for granted that this will be a pivotal variable. Instead, there is
empirical evidence suggesting that U.S. corporations that do not benefit from
stock options' tax deductibility nevertheless grant them as frequently as other
firms. 284  This pattern suggests in turn that tax treatment is in fact not
determinative with respect to the use of stock options as a form of managerial
remuneration.
Other aspects of U.S. tax policy illustrate that tax rules may not have the
sort of impact on executive compensation that might be anticipated. In 1993,
President Clinton, fulfilling a campaign pledge to halt "excessive executive
pay," initiated changes to tax law that disallowed tax deductibility of executive
pay exceeding $1 million annually, unless the additional compensation was
"performance related. 285 Data collected in subsequent years indicates that this
change did very little to slow increases in executive pay and only fostered a
minor substitution of performance-related pay for salary. 286 This pattern,
together with the evidence on the deductibility of stock options, suggests that
corporate tax policies may in fact not have a significant impact on globalization
trends in executive compensation.
B. Labor Law
Compensation experts warn that U.S.-style incentive-oriented managerial
compensation could conflict with national labor legislation. Several countries in
stock options that qualify as "ISOs" (incentive stock options). See MICHAEL S. SIRKIN & LAWRENCE K.
CAGNEY, ExEcuTiVE COMPENSATION §5.02[2] (2000). On the implications of this, see Saul Levmore,
Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1912 (2001).
282. Wolfgang Bernhardt, Stock Options For or Against Shareholder Value? New Compensation
Plans for Top Management and the Interests of Shareholders, 7 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 123,
129 (1999); Diane Francis, The Scourge of Stock Options, NAT'L POST, May 24, 2001, at C3; Johnston,
supra note 6; Zukis, supra note 278.
283. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at 665; see also Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI- L. REV. 847,
866-67 (2003).
284. Hall & Liebman, supra note 281, at 29.
285. Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713,
714, 738 (1995).
286- Hall & Liebman, supra note 24, at 34-36, 42; cf Alarie, supra note 217, at 66-68.
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Europe and Latin America have laws regarding "acquired rights" that might,
over time, transform compensation conditioned on performance into
entitlements.2 87 Since companies will understandably be reluctant to risk this
transformation, acquired rights laws could deter a move towards American-style
executive compensation packages. Indeed, according to a Towers Perrin study
of stock options, these rules have had a "very important" effect on the awarding
of such compensation in France and Mexico.
2 88
The impact of "acquired rights" legislation should not, however, be over-
estimated. While share option plans might constitute an "entitlement" under
289acquired rights legislation in some countries, they may not in others. Also,
companies' experience in Brazil suggests that, even if acquired rights
regulations do apply to incentive-oriented pay arrangements, the practical
impact will not necessarily be significant. 29 During the 1990s, performance-
based pay became substantially more popular as Brazilian subsidiaries of major
multinationals offered lucrative bonus schemes to lure managerial talent away
from domestic companies. In response to this trend, and in direct contradiction
of existing legislation, Brazil's Labor Ministry expressly authorized domestic
291companies to use variable pay based on corporate performance.
VII. "SOFT LAW"
"Soft law" is an increasingly important determinant of international
corporate behavior. 9 2 For present purposes, we define the term as corporate
rules and guidelines promulgated by private organizations rather than by
legislatures, government regulators, or judges. 93 Under this definition, the fact
that those formulating the relevant standards act pursuant to a statutory mandate
does not affect the regulations' "soft law" status. Hence, in an American
context, accounting standards developed by the privately organized Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) qualify as "soft law," even though the
Board exercises powers delegated to it by the SEC.294 Similarly, listing rules
governing the privately owned New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
287. Gross & Wingerup, supra note 11, at 29; Tara Parker-Pope, Culture Clash: Do US.-Style Stock
Compensation Plans Make Sense in Other Countries?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at R7; Sven
Tischendorf, Planning for Stock Options in Germany, INT'L. TAX REv., Dec. 1998-Jan. 1999, at 39.
288. TOwERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 10.
289. Jeffrey R. Gates & David E. Reid, Translating Your ESOP Abroad, FIN. EXECUTIVE, July
1994, at 26.
290. Tom Leander, Latin Comp Joins the Fray, GLOBAL FIN., Aug. 1998, at 27.
291. In the Towers Perrin study of stock options, "acquired rights" legislation was found to be
"somewhat important" in Brazil. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 32, at 10. There were six other countries
where the situation was found to be the same. Id.
292. Branson, supra note 177, at 670-71,
293. Id. (providing other definitions).
294. For more background on the FASB and its relationship with the SEC, see CHEFFINS, supra note
17, at 376-77,410-11.
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NASDAQ are "soft law." Even though the SEC has the power to veto proposed
regulations and amend or delete existing rules, the NYSE and NASDAQ
formulate and enforce the relevant standards.295
"Soft law" touches on various executive pay issues. One is shareholder
voting. To use an American example, the listing rules of the NYSE and
NASDAQ stipulate that, subject to a few exceptions, listed companies must
obtain shareholder approval before introducing a stock option plan."' On the
foreign side, the Australian Stock Exchange's listing rules provide that, under
an employee incentive scheme, shareholders must vote on the issuance of
securities to directors. 2 97 The stock market rules in New Zealand, Hong Kong,
and Singapore provide for similar regulations.
29
8
"Soft law" can also address disclosure issues. Britain was a "first mover" in
this regard, as disclosure of executive pay was dealt with in considerable detail
in London Stock Exchange listing rules beginning in the mid- 1990s 2 99 until the
relevant rules were shifted to legislation in 2002.300 Similarly, Germany now
stands out as a country in which "soft law" has strongly influenced disclosure
regulation. 30 1 Under German corporate legislation, companies are not obliged to
divulge remuneration arrangements for individual corporate officials. 3 02 In
2002, however, the federal legislature amended the German Stock Corporation
Act to compel publicly traded companies to disclose whether their corporate
governance practices complied with a code drafted by a business-led
committee. 30 3 Changes made to the code in 2003 require listed companies to
publish a detailed breakdown of the pay arrangements of each director serving
295. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78s(b)-(c) (2004). For discussion, see Roberta S.
Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 339 (2001).
296. A 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission ruling approving changes to the NYSE and
NASDAQ listing rules narrowed considerably the range of exceptions. For background, see Self-
Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release, No. 34-48108, 2003 LEXIS SEC 1540 (June 30,
2003).
297. Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules, 10.14.
298. See Jonathan Lemberg & Kathleen Keeler, Equity Compensation: Bringing U.S.-Style Stock
Option Plans to Asia, INT'L FIN L. REV., Oct. 2001, at Supplement 33, 36; Taking Stock of Business, N.Z.
HERALD, Jan. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7609569.
299. For an overview, see RICHARD SMERDON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
66-69 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998); Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom:
Lessons for Canada, 28 CAN. BUS. L.J. 69, 83 (1997) [hereinafter Cheffins, Corporate].
300. The self-regulatory orientation of disclosure regulation was in fact displaced to a significant
extent in 2000 when the Financial Services Authority, a government regulator, replaced the Stock
Exchange as the administrator of the listing rules. For further details, see infra notes 3 18-320 and
accompanying text.
301. It also appears that listing rules are being used to bolster executive pay disclosure in India.
RAMAIYA, 15th ed., supra note 194, at 2747.
302. See supra notes 253-254 and related discussion.
303. On the commission and the legislative backing it has, see Commission of the German
Corporate Governance Code, German Corporate Governance Code, available at http://www.corporate-
govemance-code.de/index-e.html; Theodor Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany, 3 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 18 1, 182-83 (2003); Hugh Williamson, Germany Faces More Corporate Reform, FIN. TIMES, July
7, 2003, at FT Fund Management 7.
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on the management board or explain why such disclosure has not been made.
30
4
Observers anticipate that large companies will not want to justify opacity, and
will instead disclose executive pay in accordance with the precepts of the
code.
30 5
"Soft law" accounting standards can also govern disclosure of information
on managerial compensation and thereby affect how companies deal with
remuneration. For instance, some attribute the popularity of stock options in the
United States to their treatment under FASB guidelines covering the income
statement. 30 6 According to FASB standards, a corporation awarding stock
options with no attached performance conditions does not have to set the "cost"
against profits, 30 7 though the information does have to be disclosed in footnotes
to the accounts. Since granting stock options to executives does not affect the
"bottom line," U.S. accounting rules allegedly create a bias in favor of this form
of compensation, at least where the options are of the "plain vanilla" variety.
30 8
Amid scandal-induced criticism of alleged abuses of incentive-oriented
executive compensation, the FASB launched a debate in 2002 over accounting
for stock-based remuneration. 309 At present, it is unclear whether America's
publicly traded companies will ultimately be compelled to "expense" options in
their financial statements.
310
While FASB guidelines might affect to some degree the form of America's
304. Bertrand Benoit, New Rules Put German Pay Out in the Open, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at
28.
305. Id.
306. For examples, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 45. In Britain, the equivalent document is
known as the profit-and-loss account. See The Party's Over, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, at Survey of
Corporate Finance 16.
307. See SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra note 248, § 5.02[5]; Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives:
Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 227, 276-78 (2001). Even with plain vanilla options, a company must deduct the cost from
profits if the options are "repriced"; FASB Offers More Guidance on Stock Options, J. ACCOUNT., July
2000, at 18; Richard Waters & Paul Abrahams, Raising Stock from the Deep, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000,
at 17.
308. Murphy, supra note 11, at 2514-15; Gretchen Morrison, Investors May Now Eye Costs of Stock
Options, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Cl; David Leonhardt, Will Today's Huge Rewards Devour
Tomorrow's Earnings?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 3, at 1.
309. On the launching of the debate by the FASB and the reasons for it, see ACCOUNTING FOR
STOcK-BASED COMPENSATION: A COMPARISON OF FASB STATEMENT No., 123, ACCOUNTING FOR
STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, AND ITS RELATED INTERPRETATIONS, AND IASB PROPOSED IFRS,
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Financial Accounting Series, No. 1102-001 13-14 (Financial Accounting
Standards Board, Nov. 18, 2002); Andrew Hill and Peronet Despeignes, Balancing Options, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2002, at 18; Greg Hitt and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Perk Police: Stock Options Come Under Fire
in Wake of Enron's Collapse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at Al. If this change occurs, it could help
bring about a convergence in international accounting standards for stock options. Andrew Parker and
Andrew Hill, Standard Setters Are Targeting Stock Options Again, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1I, 2002, at 11.
310. On the status of the debate, see Financial Accounting Standards Board, Project Updates: Stock
Based Compensation (last updated: August 22, 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/project/stock-
basedcomp.shtnl. Even without reform, a growing number of U.S. companies have voluntarily begun
to treat stock options as an expense: Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002
Style, 40 HOUS. L. REv. 1, 72 (2003).
Vol. 1: No. 2, 2004
HeinOnline  -- 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 278 2004
The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay
executive remuneration, 311 they do not entirely explain why stock options are
more popular in the United States than they are in other countries. The
promulgation of accounting standards is not universal-Germany only
established an independent standard setter in 1998312-and, where standards are
well-established, they commonly do not include guidance on the treatment of
share-based remuneration. 313 The result is that, just as with FASB rules, the
granting of stock options does not affect the corporate "bottom line." 314 As is
the case with the United States, reform is on the policy agenda.315 Still, for now,
the key point is that, since the accounting bias in favor of stock options
currently exists outside the United States, other factors must account for the
unique popularity of this form of compensation among America's publicly
traded corporations.
Soft law, in addition to addressing shareholder voting and disclosure, can
directly set down guidelines for the determination of executive pay. Over the
past few years, various "blue ribbon" committees around the world (often
staffed by business leaders and stock market officials) have drafted codes so as
to provide publicly traded corporations with guidance on a range of corporate
governance issues. 316 These committees often address the setting of executive
pay.317 A path-breaking forerunner on this count was a corporate governance
code set out in the London Stock Exchange's listing rules. Beginning in 1995,
311. For analysis see Bebchuk etal., supra note 15, at810-11; Core et al.,supra note 102,at43.
312. Reform in Germany, ACCOUNTANT, July 21, 2000, at 17.
313. Kimberley Crook, Accounting for Share-based Remuneration 2 (unpublished working paper,
on file with the authors, 2003); ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (U.K.), SHARE-BASED PAYMENT
APPENDLx E, (2000) (discussing the accounting treatment of the issuance of shares in return for services
in countries represented in the G4 +1, an accounting think-tank composed of standard-setters from
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain, and the United States),
314, Reform in Germany, supra note 312 (discussing Germany); Thorold Barker & Michael Peel,
Companies Given No Choice on Revealing Share Options, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 2000, at 27 (UK);
Mitchell, supra note 13 (Australia); Ron Paterson, Grasping the Nettle, ACCOUNTANCY (UK), Sept. 5,
2000, at 102 (UK); Phillip Day, Stock Options in Asia Face Change, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2002, at C16.
In Canada, by virtue of changes made to accounting standards in 2002, companies must disclose the
value of options granted in the notes to their financial statements. On the rule, and its impact, see
Christine Wiedman et al., Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation: The Devil is in the Details, IVEY
BUS. J., July/Aug. 2003, at 1.
315. The deliberations of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a private group
based in London, constitute the focal point for discussion. On the IASB's deliberations, see Crook,
Accounting, supra note 313, at 7-10. In Canada, however, accounting regulators have already announced
that Canadian accounting standards will be amended to compel companies to record stock options as a
business expense. See Janet McFarland, Accounting Board Dims Stock Options 'Appeal, GLOBE & MAIL,
March 26, 2003, at B2; Exposure Draft, STOCK BASED COMPENSATION AND OTHER STOCK BASED
PAYMENTS (Accounting Standards Board, December 2002), available at http://www.cica.ca/ed.
316. On the countries in which a governance code has been issued, and on those responsible for such
activity, see Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Reform: Britain as an Exporter, 8 HUME PAPERS
ON PUB. POL'Y (# 1) 10, 13-14 (2000) [hereinafter Cheffins, Reform]; David Nobum et al., International
Corporate Governance Reform, 12 EUR. BUS. J. 116 (2000).
317. Voluntary guidelines issued by institutional investors on executive pay constitute another
example of "soft law" aimed at the setting of managerial remuneration. On the role they play in the
United States and Britain, see Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 122, at 313.
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the code instructed listed companies to take into consideration the "wider scene"
(such as pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the business), to avoid
paying more than necessary when hiring talented executives, and to follow
detailed guidelines in designing performance-related compensation.318 In 2000,
a government regulator (the Financial Services Authority, or "FSA") was vested
with authority to administer the listing rules for companies quoted on the
London Stock Exchange.319 Though no longer constituting "soft law," the
current listing rules continue to contain a modified version of code principles on
executive pay first introduced in 1995.320
Listed companies in Britain have never been obliged to comply with
corporate governance codes offering guidance on how to set executive pay.
Instead, they have only been required to disclose whether they have conformed
with the relevant standards. 32 Nevertheless, compliance with the standards has
322been substantial. Hence, it is sensible to infer that Britain's best practice
guidelines on executive pay have influenced the configuration of managerial
remuneration, 323 even if they were originally developed as "soft law."
The British example notwithstanding, it is unclear whether corporate
governance codes offering guidance on the setting of managerial remuneration
will have a significant impact elsewhere. In some jurisdictions, the relevant
document receives little or no backing from securities regulations or stock
market listing rules, thus rendering compliance purely voluntary. 324 In addition,
the guidelines offered are typically less detailed than those which were
introduced in Britain, with a standard format being a few sentences stressing the
importance of linking pay to performance. 325 "Soft law" guidelines framed in
318. SMERDON, supra note 299, at 72-75.
319. On the Financial Services Authority's status as the administrator of the Listing Rules, see
OFFICIAL LISTING OF SECURITIES (CHANGE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY) REGULATIONS 2000, S.I.
2000/968.
320. See Fin. Servs. Auth., Listing Rules, Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Code of Best
Practice, § I.B, Sched. A, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lrcomcode3.pdf (last visited
Dec. 7, 2004).
321. SMERDON, supra note 299, at 67; Fin. Servs. Auth., Listing Rules, 12.43A(b); Cheffins,
Corporate, supra note 299, at 82-83. Those failing to divulge departures from the relevant guidelines
have been subject to various possible sanctions, including delisting. Cheflins, Corporate, supra note 299,
at 83; Fin. Servs. Auth., Listing Rules, 1.9.
322. See, e.g., I-AMPEL REPORT, supra note 265, 1.10; COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP,
MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK 3.129
(2000).
323. HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 265, 1.9 (discussing disclosure); PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
RESEARCH CONSULTANTS LTD., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2000 25 (2000) (discussing the length of
directors' service contracts, dealt with in the Combined Code, B. 1.7).
324. For a breakdown of countries where the corporate governance code is merely voluntary as
compared with those where there is regulatory backing, see Cheffins, Reform, supra note 316, at 14;
Holly J. Gregory, Overview of Corporate Governance Guidelines & Codes of Best Practice in
Developing & Emerging Markets 3 (1999) (unpublished working paper on file with authors).
325. See. e.g., GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (as amended on May 21, 2003), 4.2.3,
available at http://www.corporate-govemance-code.de/eng/download/DCGK_E200305.pdf (last visited
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this sort of general way may well lack the sort of clout required to significantly
affect trends in executive pay.
VIII. CULTURE
"Culture" is difficult to define with precision, 326 and it may constitute
327nothing more than a country's particular legal and financial arrangements.
Still, experts on managerial compensation frequently draw upon the concept to
explain why remuneration arrangements differ considerably across countries.
328
Thus, culture-which we will define as a society's shared values,
understandings, and assumptions3 9-merits examination as a variable
potentially affecting the globalization of executive pay.
It has been said that foreign cultural sensitivities toward lavish managerial
remuneration might help to "prevent the wretched excess of... American-size
pay packages." 330 Underlying this view is the assumption that the United States
is highly "tolerant of income inequality, especially if the inequality is driven by
differences in effort, talent or entrepreneurial risk taking."331 On the other hand,
Americans do worry about the fairness of their market-based system; according
to one observer, criticizing executive compensation is "something of a national
pastime." 332 Ultimately, though, "Americans suffer neither envy nor egalitarian
yearnings when gazing at the fortunes of their business leaders." '333 This, in turn,
month date, year); COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CODE OF BEST PRACTICE FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9.1 (1999) (Korea), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country-documents/korea/code korea.pdf (last visited month date, year), and
related discussion; COMMITTEE FOR THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE 8.2 (2002) (Italy), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country-documents/italy/codeit-jul2002-eng.pdf; Harilaos V. Mertzanis,
Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 89, 97 (2001)
(discussing a report issued in 1999).
326. Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of
Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 166 (2001).
327. Back on Top?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 1995, at Survey S3.
328. Sydney R. Robertson, Establishing Global Compensation Strategies, in COMPENSATION
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 603, 606-7; Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of
Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1261 (2002).
329. DERESKY, supra note 180, at 105.
330. Damn Yankees, supra note 13; see also Herbert A. Henzler, The New Era of Eurocapitalism,
HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1992, at 57, 60; Johnston, supra note 6; Richard Cohen, Jack Welch and
"Class Envy", WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at A21 (arguing that more "class envy" in the United States
might "act as a brake on the whole Greed is Good movement").
331. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at n.667.
332. Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership Lens: A
Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 153, 153 (2000). On perceptions of the market
economy in the United States and how they relate to executive pay, see Wallowing in Wages,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 65
333. Wallowing in Wages, supra note 115, at 66. For more negative characterizations of American
attitudes, see Gay, supra note 66 ("swashbuckling culture"); Simon Caulkin, Harder and Harder to
Swallow, OBSERVER. May 4, 2003, at 21 ("(b)oardroom excess is as American as apple pie and
violence"). Cf Roe, supra note 328, at 1261 (arguing that Americans envy but do not hate the rich).
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allegedly provides a hospitable platform for lucrative performance-oriented
executive pay.
334
Matters supposedly are much different in other countries. A strong
egalitarian impulse, it is said, may create distaste for hierarchy and enforce a
presumption that "enrichment of an individual on the backs of the workers is...
exploitation. '" 335 To illustrate, people in continental European countries are said
336to be acutely sensitive to pay differentials based on rank, and are reputedly
uneasy about conspicuous displays of wealth.337 Similarly, the Japanese
allegedly subscribe to the adage that "when in public, wear cotton. If you must
wear silk, wear it at home."
338
Strikingly, even in English-speaking countries reputed to share a common
business culture with the United States, this account of cultural aversion to high
executive pay is invoked. 339 For instance, one commentator has noted that "[t]he
British have always been suspicious of wealth, particularly of the rich who
made their money in the marketplace. ' 34° This bias purportedly explains why
executive pay arrangements in Britain are not as lucrative or performance-
oriented as in the United States.34 1 The discrepancy in managerial remuneration
between the United States and Canada has also been ascribed to "fundamental
cultural differences," 342 namely Canada's "gentler society ' 343 and "stubborn
egalitarian streak., 344 Experts on Australian executive compensation have
spoken similarly about the country's comparatively modest managerial pay,
saying that Australians are uncomfortable with "tall poppies" who stand out
334. Cox, supra note 4; Michael Crawford, Peanuts for Elephants, CAN. Bus., July 1994, at 16;
Morais, et al., supra note 66; Maria Slade, NZ Executives Pay Third World Salaries, INDEP.
BuS.WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 1997, at 23. See also David Leonhardt, Executive Pay Drops Offthe Political
Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at Week in Review 5; Murphy, Explaining, supra note 283, 855-56
(drawing attention to a general lack of hostility towards generous executive pay in the United States).
335. Fung, supra note 81, at 39; see also Gross & Wingerup, supra note 11, at 27; Woodmff, Across
Europe, CEOs Get No Respect, supra note 274; Birgit Gugath & Neal E. Boudette, Angry German Public
Lashes Out at CEO Pay, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 6,2002, at A6.
336. David Reilly et al., Europe's Low Pay-Rage Threshold, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2003, at A8.
337. See, e.g., Tully, supra note 58.
338. Berger, supra note 90.
339. On business culture typologies, see DERESKY, supra note 180, at 117-18.
340. William Rees-Mogg, The Fat Cat is the Pensioner's Friend, TiMES, June 3, 1996, at 20; see
also Parker-Pope, supra note 65; Therese Raphael, Hunting Fat Cats, Shooting Wild, WALL ST. J. EuR.,
June 26, 2002, at A9.
341. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 19, at nn.667-68; Martin Vander Weyer, Too Much Cream,
INDEP., Aug. 16, 1998, at 16; but cf Martin Dickson, Alice in Wonderland World of Executive Pay, FIN.
TIMES, June 22/23, 2002, at 15 (arguing that disclosure of executive compensation in Britain is highly
complex because "the knee-jerk UK antipathy to high pay" leaves companies wary about revealing how
much top managers stand to earn).
342. Crawford, supra note 334.
343. Gay, supra note 66.
344. Deirdre MeMurdy, Taking Stock of Options, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 28, 1997, at 49; see also Paul
Waldie, Canadian CEOs in Middle of Pay Pack, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 26, 1999, at B6.
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economically.
345
If culture is as important as the received wisdom suggests, it could
potentially deter convergence of executive pay along U.S. lines. Remuneration
consultants report that in continental Europe and Japan, executives find
distasteful the massive pay-outs American companies deliver to high-flying
managers.3 46 Allegedly, "the greed factor is lower than in the US, ' 347 manifested
in a belief that those who run companies should not seek inordinately large
managerial compensation.3 48 To the extent that executive self-restraint is firmly
entrenched, it will act as a brake on a shift towards U.S.-style executive pay.
A sense that companies serve a range of "social" objectives rather than
simply existing to maximize shareholder return could also impede a transition
towards the U.S. approach to executive pay. 349 In continental Europe and the
market-oriented economies of Asia, managers are often characterized as trustees
acting on behalf of a corporate community that encompasses constituencies
other than profit-oriented investors. 350  An American-style "incentivized"
managerial services contract will give management a financial inducement to
promote shareholder interests potentially at the expense of other "stakeholders."
Correspondingly, heavy use of variable pay could create considerable anxiety
outside the shareholder class.351 So long as the "public service" notion of the
company continues to be taken seriously, this apprehension could inhibit the
adoption of the U.S. pay paradigm.
352
Culture could also serve to check the Americanization of executive pay by
engendering societal resistance stemming from what Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker refer to as the "outrage" constraint.353 If executive pay packages become
highly lucrative, the violation of equity norms within society might yield a
"backlash., 354 This sort of societal "backlash" could, in turn, affect executive
pay by activating corporate self-discipline. 355 More precisely, since directors
345. Slade, supra note 334; see also Florence Chong, Salary Secrets: What Companies Have to
Fear, Bus. REV. WKLY., June 5, 1987, at 50; Julie McBeth, Who Pays the Top Salaries, Bus. REV.
WKLY., Nov. 25, 1988, at 60.
346. Lublin, supra note 154; Johnston, supra note 6.
347. Tully, supra note 58 (internal quotations omitted).
348. Gross & Wingerup, supra note 11, at 27; Damn Yankees, supra note 13; Burgess, supra note
64.
349. Blackledge, supra note 8; Burgess, supra note 64; Mazur, supra note 82.
350. See, e.g., Ronald Dore, The Asian Form of Capitalism, in P.H. Admiraal ed., THE CORPORATE
TRIANGLE: THE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE SYSTEMS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 35,
42-43, 47 (Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Bennett, supra note 16; Henzler, supra note 330, at 60-61.
351. Cheffins, Metamorphosis, supra note 10, at 515-16.
352. Burgess, supra note 64; Cheffins, Metamorphosis, supra note 10, at 514-16 (focusing on
employees in German companies).
353. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 756, 786-87.
354. Brown, supra note 183; Romesh Ratnesar, Get Rich Quick, TIME, May 8, 2000, at B7; Those
Egalitarian Swedes, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2000, at 49.
355. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 699,
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and executives could suffer social and reputational losses for violating the
outrage constraint, they might shy away from being associated with highly
lucrative service contracts.356 As Bebchuk et al. say, "[dlirectors w[ill] be loath
to approve a compensation plan that would embarrass them" and "the same fear
of embarrassment ... might also affect managers directly and thereby
discourage them from seeking such a package." 357 In extreme cases, directors
may even feel compelled by shareholder criticism or public outrage to
orchestrate the departure of an executive caught in the middle of a controversy
over executive pay.
358
Breach of the "outrage" constraint might also prompt government-instigated
reform. President Clinton's introduction of a deductibility exclusion for
managerial remuneration exceeding $1 million demonstrated that public unease
over managerial remuneration can spark regulation.359 Likewise, in the mid-
1990s, a British trade organization representing the interests of the U.K.
business community felt compelled by growing disquiet over executive pay to
set up a committee (chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury) to study the issue. 360 The
ensuing report prompted the London Stock Exchange to deal with executive pay
issues by amending the corporate governance code contained in its listing
rules.361 Neither tax reform in the United States nor the work of Britain's
Greenbury Committee in fact fully satisfied the critics of executive pay in either
country.3 62  Still, both incidents point to how violation of the "outrage
constraint" can lead to reform designed to correct controversial remuneration
practices.
While cultural values conceivably might hinder the Americanization of
executive pay, these values can also evolve in ways that will actually increase
receptivity to U.S.-style change. The experience in Britain is illustrative. During
the 1970s, British executives were paid less than their counterparts in all other
major industrial countries. 363 Moreover, at the time, British managerial culture
356. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 787-88; see also Alex Brummer, Failing Brakes on
Boardroom Pay, GUARDIAN, June 1, 1996, at 38.
357. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 787. For an example of this process, see Parker-Pope, supra
note 65.
358. This appears to be what happened to Dick Grasso, who resigned as chief executive of the New
York Stock Exchange after a controversy surrounding his compensation package. See Adrian Michaels,
The Grasso Resignation: Largest Groups Rein in Excessive Deals, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at 32. In a
similar vein, terminated CEOs may find that public disclosure of a lucrative severance package can cause
adverse publicity which leads directors to cut back on these payments. See Vauhini Vara, Hard Landing
for Europe's Ex-CEOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at A7.
359. See Murphy, supra note 285.
360. CHEFFITNS, supra note 17, at 655-56.
361. Id. at 656.
362. See, e.g., Graef Crystal, Need a Good Laugh? Look at Caps on Executive Pay, L.A.TIMES, May
21, 1995, at D2 (on the US); How Greenbury Has Boosted Executive Access, supra note 264 (on the
UK).
363. International Executive Compensation, supra note 63; Hugh Parker, The Effective Executive:
What is He Worth?, McKINSEY Q., Winter 1976, at 22, 27-28.
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was suffused with highly muted reward preferences similar to those prevailing
in egalitarian West Germany.
364
Matters changed substantially within a fairly brief period of time, however.
Throughout the 1980s, a Conservative administration imbued with a free-market
ideology governed Britain. The effect on executive pay was profound. 365 In
1988, Fortune magazine declared that "[a] pay revolution is shaking Britain.
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's bracing brand of capitalism brought not just
tax cuts and high profits but also a profound change in public attitudes. Big pay
packages are no longer frowned upon." 366 Coincident with this shift in attitude
was a dramatic change in managerial compensation. Between 1979 (when the
Conservatives took office) and 1994, the gross pay of chief executives in larger
U.K. public companies rose nearly 600%.367 By the mid-1990s, British CEOs
were no longer remuneration also-rans, but instead counted among the best paid
executives in the industrialized world.
36 8
Outside Britain, there are signs that the cultural environment is becoming
more hospitable for U.S.-style executive pay. An expert on Canadian
managerial compensation observed in 2001 that the market for executive talent
was being influenced ever more strongly by American trends, thus "imposing
the US social order on good old Canada." 369 Australia allegedly is engaged in a
"slide towards US-style inequality" and significant increases in pay awarded to
the country's executives have been cited as a "depressing milestone" marking
this trend.370 Moreover, speculation has it that Germans, both inside and outside
the boardroom, are adopting a more tolerant attitude towards wealth
accumulation. 371 Thus, while social values may continue to influence the setting
of executive pay, shifting cultural norms could actually function to bring other
countries closer to U.S.-style executive remuneration.
364. CHRISTEL LANE, MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR IN EUROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE IN
GERMANY, BRITAIN AND EUROPE 131-32 (Edward Elgar, 1989); Andreas Budde et al., Corporate Goals,
Managerial Objectives, and Organizational Structures in British and West German Companies, 3 ORG.
STUD. 1 (1982).
365. Martin Conyon & Robert Singh, Taking Care of Business: The Politics of Executive Pay in the
United Kingdom, 11 CONTEMP. BRIT. HIST. 1, 8 (1997).
366. Tully, supra note 58. On how matters progressed in the decade which followed, see Vander
Weyer, supra note 341.
367. David Goodhart, In Search of Wages that Work, FiN. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at 14. See also
Conyon & Singh, supra note 365, at 7.
368. Abowd & Kaplan, supra note 52, at 146, Table 1. A possibility is that the 1970s were
exceptional and the pay surge in the 1980s and 1990s brought matters back into line with longer-term
trends. Matthews, supra note 134.
369. Silcoff, supra note 13.
370. Mitchell, supra note 13.
371. Cheffins, Metamorphosis, supra note 10, at 497-539; Wolfgang Miinchau, Few Signs of the
'Fat Cat', FIN. TIMES, May 29, 1996, at Survey 7.
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IX. CONCLUSION
American chief executives are the most highly paid in the world, and not
surprisingly, CEO pay has proved controversial in the United States.
372
Similarly, British managers are well paid by global standards and executive
compensation has been an intensely debated topic.373 Managerial remuneration
has also attracted attention in Canada and Australia.374 Elsewhere, though,
debate about the topic has typically only flared up periodically.
375
Matters, however, may soon change. As this Article has described, there is
evidence that a "global shakeup in executive comp" could be occurring. To
reiterate, market dynamics that might foster such a shakeup include wider
dispersion of share ownership, increased cross-border hiring of executives,
growing international M & A activity, and the expansion of business activity by
multinationals. Gauging how influential these factors will be in practice is
difficult.376 Still, if their impact is substantial and a strong Americanization
trend develops, the changes likely will prompt vigorous debate in the affected
countries.
The controversy which would ensue if U.S.-style executive pay becomes
more prominent would place policymakers under pressure to confront the
situation. Views on the appropriate response would no doubt differ. Those
supportive of a shift in an American direction might assert that domestic
companies are justified in changing policy since talented nationals would be less
likely to emigrate in pursuit of higher pay. They also might cite America's
successful corporate economy as testimony to the effectiveness of performance-
oriented compensation. Underlying this contention would likely be the premise
that the introduction of a highly "incentivized" approach to remuneration would
provide a valuable boost to companies that had previously treated shareholders
as "second class citizens."
377
On the other hand, after the corporate governance scandals which afflicted
372. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
373. See infra note 387 and accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., Francis, supra note 282; Deirdre McMurdy, The Polarized Economy, MACLEAN'S,
Oct. 7, 1996, at 49; Rod McQueen, Executive Payoffs are out of Control, NAT'L POST (Canada), Apr. 3,
2000, at C3 (on Canadian executives); S. Karene Witcher, Big CEO Pay as Lure Riles Some Australians,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 31, 1998, at B6.
375. Ferrarini et al., supra note 89, at 4 (saying that the controversy has been restricted to countries
with dispersed share ownership but noting that there was concern about executive pay in France);
Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance
Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REv. 69, 159-61 (1998); Gail Edmondson, France: A CEO's Pay
Shouldn't be a Secret, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 9, 1999, at 24 (saying that with respect to executive pay French
society had yet "to confront its schizophrenic feelings about wealth").
376. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
377. For examples of those who have made this argument in an international context, see Steven
Brull, Sony Links Executive Pay to Stocks, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug, 11, 1995, at 11; Ira T. Kay, High
CEO Pay Helps USEconomy Thrive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1998, at A22; David S. Milstein, Pay Japan's
Executives to Perform, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at 10.
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the United States at the end of the 1990s stock market boom (such as Enron
Corp., WorldCom Inc., and Tyco International Ltd.), policymakers elsewhere
might see borrowing from the American model of capitalism as unwise.378 Most
pertinent for present purposes, policymakers might conclude that, in the case of
executive pay, drawbacks to the American approach would make imitation
undesirable. As Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker have argued, managerial
compensation in the United States arguably is a manifestation of
counterproductive "rent extraction," not the product of fair-minded efforts to
align the interests of shareholders and executives. 379 Also, American-style
incentivized compensation packages could tempt executives to engage in
misleading or dishonest earnings management in order to prop up their share
prices until they can unload their equity.
380
An additional reason why the U.S. approach to executive pay might be
thought of as an inappropriate model for other countries is that unswerving
confidence in the notion of the all-powerful "superstar" CEO underpinned the
shift towards lucrative performance-oriented pay in American public
companies. Even Americans are now acknowledging that a quiet, understated
leadership style might be more likely to deliver strong results. 381 At the same
time, there might be fears that the awarding of U.S.-style compensation would
foster resentment among rank-and-file employees, with a consequent drop in
morale and productivity. 382 Finally, in strongly egalitarian countries, a growing
gap between ordinary workers' wages and corporate leaders' soaring fortunes
would be societally objectionable in itself.383
This Article provides guidelines for regulators called upon to address the
potential Americanization of executive pay. If a regulator prefers to curb
convergence in an American direction, our analysis suggests the most direct
course of action would be to orchestrate an increase in the top marginal rate of
378. Evelyn Iriani, U.S. Business Model a Tough Sell Overseas, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2002, at Al;
Wave of Corporate Scandals Could Tilt World Business Away from American Model, WALL ST. J., June
28, 2002, at A10.
379. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that the
diagnosis that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker offer is correct. See Thomas, supra note 14; Holman W.
Jenkins, Outrageous CEO Pay Revisited, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at Al 7.
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income tax. This is because under the new conditions, executives would know
that they would keep less of what they earned and thus would not press as hard
for lucrative remuneration. 3 84 On the other hand, the politics of taxation are
delicate and it is doubtful whether concern about the level of managerial
compensation could ever provide, in isolation, a sufficiently strong political
platform for a more progressive tax regime.385
Tax reform is not the only regulatory strategy available to policymakers
seeking to impede the Americanization of managerial remuneration, but there is
reason to doubt whether the alternatives would achieve the desired objective.
For instance, the analysis offered here indicates that amending corporate law to
introduce "direct" regulation of executive pay, strengthen directors' duties, or
impose new shareholder voting requirements would likely not cause a
significant reconfiguration of managerial compensation. Bolstering disclosure
requirements would also be unwise and might indeed serve to accelerate the
Americanization of executive pay. Moreover, deploying "soft law" would not be
a particularly promising alternative. Consider Britain. Detailed "soft law"
guidance was put in place during the mid- 1990s and those setting executive pay
were instructed to take into account the "wider scene." 386 Nevertheless,
managerial remuneration subsequently rose substantially in U.K. companies.
387
Assume now that our policymaker has concluded that the preferred course
of action is to foster a shift towards the U.S. executive pay model. Under such
circumstances, introducing stronger disclosure requirements would be a prudent
course to follow. The primary reason would be that shareholders, having
additional information at hand, would be well situated to press for compensation
packages that linked pay more closely with performance. Also, the likelihood
that enhanced disclosure regulation might well foster an upward ratchet in
executive pay would presumably be an acceptable by-product of reform.
Another approach that a policymaker who is favorably disposed towards
U.S.-style executive pay might adopt would be to promote the unwinding of
control blocks in domestic companies. All else being equal, a company with a
"core" shareholder will probably have lower executive pay than its widely held
counterpart, and performance-oriented compensation will likely play a less
important role. A popular thesis at present is that a country that wants to foster
outside investment in domestic companies can "jump start" a move in this
direction by enacting laws designed to protect minority shareholders.388 It is by
384. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
385. CHEFFINS, supra note 17, at 706-7.
386. Supra note 319 and related discussion.
387. Charles Arthur, The Fat Cats are Back, THE INDEP. (London), July 25, 2000, at 3; Philip
Thornton, Executive Pay Increase Set to Revive Row, THE INDEP. (London), Oct. 23, 2000, at 15.
388 On this line of thinking, see Cheffins, Bedrock, supra note 120 at 5-6, 16.
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no means certain whether any such attempt will succeed.389 Still, for a country
that does make a law-driven transition towards the sort of dispersed pattern of
ownership that prevails in the United States and Britain, a likely by-product
would be at least a partial shift towards the American model of executive pay.
This Article has not sought to address explicitly whether a move towards the
U.S. model of executive pay would be a "good thing." Instead, the purpose here
has primarily been descriptive, namely identifying and discussing the variables
likely to influence global managerial remuneration trends. The analysis that has
been offered here, however, does have significant normative ramifications.
Specifically, this Article provides a "check list" of factors that policymakers
outside of the United States can take into account once they have formulated a
policy on executive pay. Thus, while those wondering whether the
Americanization of executive pay would be a "good thing" will need to find
their answers elsewhere, this Article offers valuable guidance for those seeking
to implement policy decisions.
389. Id. at 16-23,
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